Daash fight the sources of the invasion of Iraq
Sunday 14-02-2016 | 5:33:11
Translation: Indian ringing - site The Hill US
The Iraqi government announced on the 28th of December 2015 liberalization city of Ramadi, Anbar province, the largest of Iraq's provinces, of organizing the so-called Islamic State, or (Daash). With cautious optimism, many international media heralded the event as the beginning of the end for the control of the organization of the Islamic state in Iraq. In fact, to regain control of the city of Ramadi is just a tactical triumph for large firepower of a military campaign by the long time. To achieve a strategic victory on the organization of the Islamic state, on Baghdad and Washington to change the basic assumptions on which the anti-led strategy Daash. Many of the comparisons between them and the Anbar Awakening fee in 2006 - 2007, when the tribal fighters and former combatants to gather against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) US support. The conventional wisdom is taken there is that the tactics of the United States was largely responsible for earning the confidence of the Sunni population, thereby enabling Washington to enter into a partnership with them in the battle to fight the insurgency. In a batch of wild American troops to secure the civilian areas, the enemy has become the subject of trust, where the local population by giving the intelligence necessary to eliminate terrorists and rebuilding of local forces with more control.
Taking Telmaham of this analysis, the senior officials in Baghdad believe that the Iraqi security forces could be conducting operations in Ramadi and retain strategic locations and confidence-building required and necessary to control the local security forces. The point of view of Baghdad, Washington if they succeeded in doing this without a deep understanding of local customs and traditions, the Iraqis, they can do this themselves. The logical thing that follows this is if the Baghdad government is to ensure a new awakening in Anbar, any future security deal between Baghdad and the Shiite leadership and the Sunni provinces will have a long-term dramatically.
In fact, the primary factor in the success of the Anbar Awakening is that most of the year, especially the Islamist militant groups, believe that al-Qaida is more hostile to US forces. In addition, the Shiite government in Baghdad, which sees the year as a pawn of Tehran, was the enemy as well. In these circumstances, the United States is now the least evil of the three and the most willing to compromise. Since the United States has developed a great influence on the formation of the Iraqi security forces and the policies of the Iraqi government, I suppose that the year of their participation in the defeat of al-Qaida and join with Washington will give them greater authority than the policies of Baghdad in the Sunni areas. In the end, the year decided to take the reins and the elimination of al-Qaeda in their provinces.
Now, after the departure of US troops from Iraq, the ball became exclusively in the court of the Iraqi government. Where the Shiite government in part so far failed in Anbar because of the perception of sectarianism as a government take its orders from Iran. Add to that the fact that the government in Baghdad more pressing priorities, including lack of trust between them and the year and a general lack of Sunni unity.
The decline in oil prices and the most pressing threats in northern Iraq means that the priority for scarce resources Baghdad has been given to the Shiite and Kurdish parties (while Anbar, Iraq's largest province, did not have the Sunni society only a small influence in Baghdad). In addition, the resulting lack of mutual trust between associated with former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's forces and the police Anbarah through legitimate protests in 2013 - 2014 in Baghdad's reliance on foreign security forces to implement the local law. Finally, the division is still between the year due to differences over the protests in 2013 - 2014 prevents them from creating a united front. This division has strengthened the confidence of the government in Baghdad not combatants year and a preference to choose the organizers fighters and enthusiastic processing larger than the Shiites and Kurds in the northern provinces.
However it gotta Baghdad now has an opportunity to play an important role in forming a better result in Anbar, as Washington did in 2006-2007. If Baghdad were interested in the production of new Sunni revolt against al Daash, it must first address the same fundamentals, and agree to make concessions, and find common denominators of interest. Government can play this by passing the Iraqi National Guard law to formalize the role of the Sunni tribal fighters and officers of the former army in the battle against al Daash, a move that would indicate the year that Baghdad is sincere in its intentions by giving more powers to the Sunni provinces to oversee the security. The government can also make concessions to the demands of Sunni politicians more autonomy, and the application of equality in the de-Baathification law, the release of prisoners, and to devote more money for salaries, weapons and equipment for local fighters who are fighting to organize the Islamic state, and who have been previously frustration because of the Baghdad government trust them.
Without addressing these basic needs, it has to look at the Baghdad government by many stakeholders Sunnis continue as an enemy, the government will not be able to unite against Daash. And that the government's battle against al Daash would continue and would like to kill cockroaches without addressing the source of the invasion.