The state of the second-Maliki was a disaster .. and his handling of protests a year hurt his credib

The state of the second-Maliki was a disaster .. and his handling of protests a year hurt his credibility as a national leader among everyone 


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With the hottest campaign in the thirtieth of April, increased the hottest situation in the city of Fallujah.  The situation there to take a tragic turn for the worse since late 2013 when the army returned - after a long absence - to respond to the protests in al-Anbar province. 
 However the presence of troops on the outskirts of the city of Fallujah and fighters set Daash within them, and with an attempt of the military junta - who fancied himself in the city - to walk between the two parties, it appears that the city is preparing to repeat the battles that took place in 2004, when he witnessed some of the fiercest battles with U.S. forces. 
That the possibility of miscalculation, escalation or calculated, very large.  It is too late to steps that could be taken to reduce tensions before the elections.  Any lasting solution requires confronting the deep roots of isolation in a country dominated by sectarian tensions. 
 The emergence of a Daash is introduced - and not the main reason - a symptom of poor governance, which is the main cause of instability in Iraq.  The government and the United Nations and the United States have to deal with a group Daash differently from Fallujah and the military council as a whole, and not embedded with some randomness in the war on terror. 
 When the Iraqi authorities in 2013 to vacate the protest, which lasted for a whole year in the city, which demanded better treatment of the sitters of Baghdad, Fallujah residents came out to the streets.  The group took advantage of Daash chaos that followed, and pushed its forces into the city and claimed to have grabbed the reins.  Prosecutors had exaggerated; While the group raised the black flag over some administrative buildings downtown, the city's residents repel most attacks and forced them to retreat to the outside perimeter.  But Baghdad has been the cause of the war; trapping the city and residents had ignored attempts to mediate on the withdrawal of Daash and threatened to attack the city. 
 Did not have any sympathy with the people of Daash, but the hatred of the Iraqi army - which they see as a tool for system sectarian orientation Tehran and sectarian discrimination against Sunnis, especially the people of Anbar - grew deeper.  Rebels holding the city a bad deal and formed an alliance with the acceptance Daash.  Maybe enables jihadists to keep the army away, but that they justified the government's claim that the whole town was under the control of jihadists. 
 And rooted self-reinforcing circle; jihadist activity is encouraged to try to delay the government, and this in turn would have required more protection jihadist.  Fallujah fighters and central authorities in Baghdad were each pretending to be a true patriot in the country, and making fun of his opponent as an enemy alien. 
 Daash benefited by renewing its support base in Iraq, which has shrunk since the Awakening movement that turned against al-Qaida in 2006., But with the escalation of fighting in Syria and the flow of weapons superior, the group has become once again a magnet for disaffected in Iraq. 
 This crisis saved the chances of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in parliamentary elections that had seemed sullen before entering Daash to the scene.  The second term is a disaster; Over the past year, causing rise in violence in the country and the increasing violations of the security forces and the floods in the capital and the government's mismanagement of the Sunni protests, in damaging his credibility as a national leader among Sunnis and Shiites. 
 In order to save his future, it may quote something from the game, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by exaggerating the threat posed to the stability of the country Fallujah.  The game has a lot of ramifications; On the one hand it was an opportunity to transform the terms of the conflict, and the rally Shiites against alleged terrorists, and divide and neutralize the year, and to show the army's image as a defender of the state, and the pressure on the international community - by focusing on terrorism - in order to gain support. 
 Al-Qaeda pose a serious threat, and that the government mobilize all possible assistance they can get them.  One means of doing so and to defuse tensions in Anbar, is to distinguish between the elements in the province, especially between local militants who have grievances and political interests between the jihadists and Daash coming from outside the border, and who make up a curse on the people of the city. 
 However coherent identity unique in Anbar, the Fallujah prefer to expel the jihadists if the system is guaranteed not to attack them, as happened a decade ago when she joined the Awakening to the government.  But the prime minister was still betting on his re-election campaign against terrorism and sectarian orientation measured is not likely to slow him neither he nor the Sunni parties spectrum. 
 The list of (united), which led the protests before but today partially aligned with the government, invested in the issue of terrorism as the government is doing; Maliki's opponents and the opponents of the year preparing for the province, believing that the elections fraudulent and they will lose even if they win. 
 Parliamentary elections - at least in Anbar - not to be trusted, not only because it takes place in a virtual war zone, but also because the violence and the fight against terrorism and focus on the security situation has become an integral part of the government in Iraq.  Contract required a new political elections are one way to encourage it. 
 The question is what will happen after the election.  In the short term, the government should work with the military council of Fallujah - and the council that in turn vows to reform his relationship with rivals of the year - in order to expel Daash of the city.  But in the long run, it must look at the violence in and around Fallujah as a result of the disadvantages of the state's political - and not a reason to - and should be dealt with on this basis.  There is no better time than this to start with this solution. 
 Recommendations: 
 In order to break up the cycle of conflict and the expulsion of Daash of Fallujah; Iraqi government: 
 First - to deal separately with the military council of Fallujah and with a Daash they were on to key players, and the use of a separate strategy for each of them, and encourage political rapprochement within the city to facilitate a military campaign to expel Daash. 
 Secondly - termination of the proceedings that will enhance cooperation between the militants and the military council Daash, including the siege and curfew and attacks on the city's infrastructure of hospitals and residential areas, and intimidation. 
 Third - promoting reconciliation within Fallujah in order to facilitate the expulsion of Daash using, inter alia; refrain from pitting faction against another (such as swaying Awakening or political groups against the military council); approval of the Mayor and the police chief of a new city elected by the military council of Fallujah and members united; providing military aid and technical director of the Mayor and the police and awakening to expel Daash of the city; allow humanitarian groups and foreign journalists. 
 The recommendations addressed to the Military Council and representatives of the Uniting Fallujah, they are; engage each other in a number of things and agree on the Mayor and the police chief of a new city; conduct a joint operation to flush out Daash of Fallujah involving the police and the military council and the Awakening Councils, and ask the central government to provide military assistance and technical resources. 
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[9:04:56 PM] MarcG.: Recommendations...
[12:06:24 AM] MarcG.: Recommendations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq are; refrain from the indiscriminate use of the term "terrorism" to refer to both parties: the military council of Fallujah and insurgents Daash; establish a connection with the members of the military council and insist that the Iraqi government: to adapt its military operations to target Daash only to refrain from indiscriminate attacks on the city; ending the siege on Fallujah; facilitate access to the city; facilitate negotiations between the military council and local representatives of the list are united and insist on the government to approve the results of these talks. 
 The government of the United States; stop military support to the Government of Iraq, while its commitment to full accountability for the use of this support; support the formation of the rule include all local factions in Fallujah (except Daash) and in particular to encourage negotiations between the military council and local members of the list are united. 
 For lasting stability in Anbar after the parliamentary elections of 2014, the political parties Sunni; give priority to restore the confidence of maintaining the political process through, inter alia; negotiate with other political forces on the role of the security institutions in order to influence the selection and appointment of military commanders in the city; strengthening the authority of the bodies conservative in the management of political affairs and security (such as choosing the chief of police and security management and resource management) through the full implementation of the provincial powers law in 2008; encourage cooperation between political leaders and tribal leaders of various political factions at all levels in order to create political strategy and security Anbar province and local leadership more inclusive. 

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