Among the “war villains” .. Bremer in the mirror of an American report and talk about the “biggest c

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[size=52]Among the “war villains” .. Bremer in the mirror of an American report and talk about the “biggest catastrophe”[/size]

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The American “Atlantic Council” website described the former US governor in Iraq, Paul Bremer, as perhaps the most critical official for his role and decisions after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, but history has rethought his role, perhaps unintentionally, has spared the United States and Iraq a catastrophe bigger than what happened.[/size]
[size=45]The report, translated by Shafaq News Agency, stated that "Bremer was for a year the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority that ruled Iraq, and he is described as one of the "bad guys" of the war and most of those blamed for the disaster, and he was criticized for wasting reconstruction funds and poor organization.[/size]
[size=45]However, the American report considered that Bremer's most famous and important decisions were his decision on May 16, 2003, to purify the Iraqi government of members of the Baath Party and to dissolve the Iraqi army on May 23, 2003.[/size]
[size=45]The report pointed out that these two decisions were criticized because they caused Iraq to plunge into the abyss of rebellion and civil war, because Bremer, in one fell swoop, threw hundreds of thousands of young men who had received military training into the street without work, while the decision to de-Baathification created cadres from the elites of the previous regime. Those who enjoy connections, experience and political savvy, which allowed them to coordinate the resistance immediately against the new American project, pointing out that the reality showed that some of the elites of this regime and its soldiers ended up helping to establish ISIS, which posed an existential threat to the state of Iraq.[/size]
[size=45]The report said that Bremer later admitted to the poor implementation of some of these decisions.[/size]
[size=45]The report continued that the dissolution of the army caused public security and stability of the state to destabilize at a time when chaos appeared to be spiraling out of control, as the phenomena of chaos and looting were accelerated by Bremer's decisions.[/size]
[size=45]The report added that the liquidation of the army's presence, in conjunction with the installation of the interim government, meant that there was American support for the chaos, in addition to that there was no clear vision of what would happen later.[/size]
[size=45]The report indicated that the disintegration was widespread, adding that while the army was linked to the suspicion of Saddam Hussein's regime, different parts of the army bore different levels of blame, noting that there were many Shiites within the army who were likely sympathetic to the regime. What is new in Iraq and its defenders, who do not have any party affiliation, have also ended up being thrown into the street alongside Saddam's loyalists, such as the Republican Guard.[/size]
[size=45]The report said that Bremer's decrees were labeled "sectarian" and that they certainly contributed to strengthening the Sunni opposition and exacerbating the rebellion in Ramadi and Fallujah. However, the report considered that the public interest of Bremer's decrees was not related to their impact on the Sunnis in Iraq, as many of them were almost certain that in any case they would be violently hostile to the new Iraq, but the impact of these decrees on the Shiites, as their political leanings were the biggest unknown. to invade Iraq.[/size]
[size=45]While the report said that Washington's experience with the Shiites is still little, it continued that the Sunnis were the allies of the United States at the time and now, especially from the hard-line Sunnis in the Gulf, noting that in light of the isolation that affected Iran and Iraq, in addition to not welcoming southern Lebanon, it The United States had little contact with the Shiites, other than through "Iranian mouthpieces," and so there was little certainty about how the Shiites would react to the invasion.[/size]
[size=45]The report indicated that the Shiites did not have feelings of love towards Saddam, as his regime brutally suppressed them and persecuted their faith, but the Shiites had little love for the West as well, as there are long memories in Iraq, and people still remember how the British installed the Sunnis to rule over their country New, and how a Sunni army came to power, and then how a Sunni political party rose, adding that the matter is a little ironic, given that the entire doctrine of the Baath Party is about overcoming the Sunni identity.[/size]
[size=45]Like the Baath Party, the army and its officers reflected Sunni institutions committed to keeping the Sunnis in power, while many Shiites believed that the United States, after toppling Saddam, would follow Britain's lead. In addition, the report referred to the horrific experience experienced by the Shiites before the invasion, when they rebelled against Saddam after the Gulf War, and were suppressed, as it is believed that the US President at the time, George Bush the Father, encouraged them to this revolution, and then abandoned them, and for this reason, the Shiites were They need someone to convince them that the United States, this time, was serious.[/size]
[size=45]Therefore, the report emphasized that "the great early victory in the Iraq war, and the vital victory," was that the Shiites were persuaded, and that they eventually supported the new state, or at least that they did not oppose it collectively. The report continued, explaining that the United States fought a fierce Sunni rebellion, but it would not have been able to prevail in the face of a general rebellion on the part of the Shiite majority, a point that Bremer's decrees contributed to avoiding.[/size]
[size=45]The report added that if Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani had called for the expulsion of the American occupiers, this would have caused 60% of Iraqis to turn their weapons against the United States, and perhaps Washington would then have withdrawn as it did in Kabul twenty years later, after being confronted by the Pashtun majority. The report concluded by saying that the Iraq war was, in essence, a "sectarian issue," adding that transforming Iraq into a democratic state means making it a Shiite state, not a Sunni state, or even a democracy.[/size]
[size=45]He made it clear that Washington did not see that, and it is not clear if Bremer did. He went on to say that the stated goal of the George W. Bush administration was to build a "secular Iraq."[/size]
[size=45]Referring to the famous decisions of the Bush administration and Bremer, he added that, no matter how clumsy they may seem, the mistake they represented was on the right side of this division, as they may have helped the United States "avoid a greater catastrophe.[/size]
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