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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Many Topics Including The Oldest Dinar Community. Copyright © 2006-2020


    International crises: the political system in Iraq is in need of radical reform but the parties stro

    Rocky
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    International crises: the political system in Iraq is in need of radical reform but the parties stro Empty International crises: the political system in Iraq is in need of radical reform but the parties stro

    Post by Rocky Wed 07 Sep 2016, 3:47 am

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    International crises: the political system in Iraq is in need of radical reform but the parties strongly resist change


     translation term 

    The system that governs Iraq since 2003 ,need radical reform, but since the political ruling class is that embody the system in many ways, they are strongly resistant to real change. And caused street protests and political intransigence in the formulation of theequation are flammable what threatens to paralyze state institutions and collapse. At the same time, the security situation is deteriorating as evidenced by a series Daesh attacks during the past period. 
    There are three dynamics of spin now; the first of the political system malfunction after 2003, designed ostensibly to ensure ethnic representation sectarian fair in the state institutions, but it actually allows thesame ethnic identities for political parties sectarian control them. The 
    second thing is the growing weakness of the people 's trust in political parties and anger over poor performance. The third dynamic is the division of political leadership especially within the large Shiite political forces - the Dawa party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic, Liberal bloc chest - which speeds up the popular discontent and the inability of the system. 
    Institutions of the country is paralyzed now and are subject to the pressure of the street movement demanding reform, but is unable to because of political parties divided. Parliament was the first victim of theconfrontation. On April 26 Prime Minister Haider al - Abadi reach a deal to replace five ministers, in a move to meet the demands of the liberal bloc by appointing ministers technocrats without harming the interests ofother parties. 
    This interim adjustment She wore inversely when the Liberals raised the stakes by calling for replacing theentire cabinet Furthermore presidencies three; the Prime Minister and the President and the House Speaker. 
    Parties that voted modest reform proposed by Abadi , in the beginning, then refused to ratify the replacement of its ministers and hindered the quorum required to convene parliament. 
    after the postponement of the vote moved the crisis into the street again when protesters entered the green Zone and stormed a building parliament on April 30. With the escalation of the conflict between the street activists and political leaders , conflicts between parties and within peaked, and now the parliament is dying. 
    In many cases , it was resentment of the political elite takes different forms of expression the most recent street protests. Over the past decade was a party relations that decides who gets the job and career opportunities and even the real estate housing in certain areas of the country. 
    This patronage networks - that is the tip of the iceberg - has increased the continuity and the worsening ofcorruption and cronyism that has long prevailed in the public sector , leaving young people without hope and aspirations that did not play according to the rules set by the elite in the green Zone. The fullness of the new generation 's desire to challenge the status quo did not work according to specific political agenda. 
    Same cause anger in fueling protests in the Sunni provinces in 2013 targeted the political establishment in theGreen Zone. Because of the overlap with the complaints of the year was government repression violent protests led to the face of Sunni - Shiite and paved the way first for Sunni insurgents and then to extremist groups, which helped to increase the momentum of Daesh in June 2014 when it swept through large parts of the Sunni provinces. 
    After a year and in August 2015 the youth came out Shiites took to the streets of Basra and other predominantly Shiite cities as a result of resentment of politicians in the green Zone to fail. the 
    away the chest of those feelings and led his supporters into the heart of the political establishment in thegreen Zone that has stoked a direct confrontation between the street and the political elites and the protests into a big variable in Iraqi politics. 
    faces true reform of the political system after the 2003 severe structural handicaps, where political parties and state institutions have become dependent on each other and help each other to survive. The system can not renew the political class - whether through elections or legislative changes - as the political class will not try togenuinely reform the system. 
    The political parties that participated in the governments of the power - sharing are the means by which theUnited States has tried through which ensure ethnic representation sectarian widely within the institutions thestate during the period of the occupation of 2003 - 2011, which gave the party representatives, who havebeen appointed as ministers, the power to fill high - level positions those closest to them and recruit party members according to their rank in the party in other positions within their ministries. 
    he also did not put a group of cadres of political parties in decision - making positions in only state institutions, but also allowed them to overcome their lack of popular support through the use of state funds to buy the loyalty of the people. So it 's not surprising that senior party members to resist reforms that could threaten the cronyism that give them the power system. The 
    way in which entrenched political parties in state institutions has kept Iraq policy , however , the same people familiar held a renewal of the political class 's efforts. Politicians young people often behave Cassapekayam older, and even if they wanted big challenge they remain dependent on patronage networks to their predecessors in order to gain influence or they are forced - under the rules of logic - to establish their own networks within the state institutions. 
    Although the isolation of such persons for institutions State is right in principle, it actually paralyzes those institutions and possibly encourage political figures to reinvest in their power to defy. For example, after replacing al - Maliki as prime minister in 2014 he withdrew the financial and security network of thegovernment, and now re - invested to challenge and weaken al - Abadi. 
    What further complicates matters is that Reform is hiding a conflict hidden power within the Shiite political bloc - Alliance home : Every party which wants Abadi weaken to achieve the deal gives him influence in theselection of ministerial cabin or guarantee its interests. 
    the reforms generated power changes within the party leaders more than it produces for democratic mechanisms such as changes or legislative elections. The renewal of leadership happens when maneuvering the political parties to keep the pressure from the street, or the result of political interference of the United States or Iran , which could favor figures and other stripped of power. 
    Even if the reshuffle did not cause weakening of the control of the parties on the state, it may be the first step in changing the balance power between and within the Shiite parties. 
    the power struggle escalates within the Dawa Party; Valebadi tries to use the reshuffle to enter into partnerships with other groups and undermine the continuing power of the owners and his allies, the more Abadi succeeded more to replace Minister greater undermine Maliki 's power base. 
    at the same time, continue Maliki - Secretary General of the Dawa Party , now - with the parties opposed to the second amendment to the prime minister in order to prevent the vote in parliament , and this increases the weakening Abadi Party keeps under his domination. 
    the Abadi was skillful in handling the crisis, it can benefit from the international and regional support for theconclusion of a series of interim agreements with Kurdish and Sunni factions as he did with the Sadrist movement, that would not only reform of the quota system in the short term, but also to strengthen its position compared with other Shiite parties, and most importantly within his own party. External Pressure will be important in the shifts authority report within the party leadership. 
    Internally, the next challenge is how to street expectations of management, if continued Sadrists to step up the bet to gain more influence , there will be a great opportunity in front of parliament to reach a full quorum to vote on the change of government, it is likely to strengthen their position as leaders of the street outside the green Zone, and would respond to disrupt the political parties change and weakening the institutional framework of the country. The storming of parliament and calls for the dismissal of the three presidencies run the risk of paying the country into a vacuum in which parties jostling with each other. 
    Perhaps no longer the post - 2003 useful system, but reform will be difficult, any sudden change can generate further instability due to excluded driving or as a result of the weakening of state institutions . Is not expected to Abadi be able to break the interdependence of political parties and state institutions. At best the United States and Iran will coordinate to manage the crisis will benefit the prime minister of their relationship to take measures contain the street and prevent the balance of power of the coup against him. In 
    other words , he forced the prime minister to walk the fine line between the street management and tomaintain the current balance of power and prevent the institutional framework of the collapse. 
     for: international crisis Group

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