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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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    Khamenei attacks moderates as a source of Iran's problems

    Rocky
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    • Post n°1

    Khamenei attacks moderates as a source of Iran's problems Empty Khamenei attacks moderates as a source of Iran's problems

    Post by Rocky Fri Aug 17, 2018 3:21 pm


    [size=32]Khamenei attacks moderates as a source of Iran's problems

    - 1 Hour Ago
    [/size]
    Khamenei attacks moderates as a source of Iran's problems %D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-341x341

    In the first public reaction to the Iranian Supreme Leader on recent Iranian protests and the mounting economic crisis, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tried to turn the tide of popular anger towards the government of President Hassan Rowhani. "Most economists and many officials agree that sanctions do not cause all these problems, but rather stem from internal affairs, management style, and operational policy planning," he said in a televised address broadcast on 13 August by local stations. This is in line with the media spotlight on corruption rather than international sanctions in reports of economic difficulties. Khamenei also pointed to Rouhani and his team regarding the partial collapse of the nuclear deal, arguing that they mismanaged negotiations with the US government, which is not credible. Most likely, his statements will give military militants more room to intervene in the government's civil affairs.
    Is it a spiritual turning point?
    In his speech, Khamenei explicitly tried to convince the Iranians - especially those who support reformist and moderate politicians - that Rouhani was responsible for the miserable outcome of the "joint comprehensive action plan" and the subsequent mounting American pressure. In this regard, the Supreme Leader has said that the government has repeatedly ignored his warnings about Washington's unreliability and firm hostility towards the Islamic Republic .
    In one statement, Khamenei seemed to feel remorse, admitting that compromising his principles and allowing the "joint" plan of action to "advance" in the first place was "my [personal] mistake." But far from acknowledging his mistake, he sarcastically highlighted the presumed strategic errors of the spiritual and his diplomatic impotence, claiming that the president's insistence on reaching an agreement at any price had pushed the country to failure and led to the suffering of the current people, "He said. The latter term is particularly bad because it gives militants a green light to intensify their pressure on Rouhani and impede his ability to pursue his own agenda.
    Similarly, by continuing to describe the government as incompetent, Khamenei encourages Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the judiciary, and other hard-line bastions to intervene in its affairs, particularly in the economic sphere. Ultimately, the speech of August 13 may be seen as a turning point in Rohani's political destiny and likely to precipitate a significant decline in his authority during the remaining years of his second term. Perhaps more importantly, his political allies - especially the reformist camp - may pay a heavy price during the upcoming parliamentary elections and other competitions.
    Trenching in the face of external pressure
    With regard to the possibility of opening new negotiations with the "tyrannical and demanding regime of the United States," Khamenei rejected this possibility mainly, arguing that such talks should not be seen as a way to reduce Iran's hostility to the United States, but rather as a tool Washington might use to " Agenda ". He then took a clearer stance on Trump's administration: "Even if we negotiate with the Americans, even theoretically, we certainly will not negotiate with the current administration." "We can engage in a dangerous negotiation game with America only when we reach the ideal economic, political and cultural goal of our authority, and become isolated from its tyranny and pressure," he said. But in the current situation, negotiations will certainly be harmful to us. "
    Khamenei also criticized US allies. Saudi Arabia and Israel were accused of helping Washington provoke mass protests and incitement to "terrorism" last December through political and financial intervention. He also criticized critics of Iran's regional activities and was particularly keen to defend the regime's continued involvement in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. However, he has ruled out mounting public concern about a possible war with the United States: "There will be no war ... we will never go to war, nor will the United States do so, because it will be totally harmful to it ... The Iranian nation has proved that it will inflict greater harm on any aggressor . "
    Confident despite the unrest
    The speech ostensibly confirmed Khamenei's growing confidence both inside and outside the country, through his repeated calls for "resistance" in domestic politics, regional adventures, and economic policy. He even "resisted" the reality at times by presenting a rosy picture of the current problems of the Islamic Republic .
    Again, this discourse was mainly aimed at a spiritual elite and its supporters. Khamenei accused them of causing economic difficulties and undermining the legitimacy and credibility of the regime, whether by lack of strategic imagination or incompetence in managing crises or opposing its "Islamic" policies or all of the above. According to Khamenei, "stubborn resistance" is the only way to escape foreign pressure and consolidate the revolution - a symbol to consolidate its authority against local rivals. He expressed the hope that the bitter experience of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan would yield the wisdom of his stubborn resistance to street protests and other demands for greater democracy. In his opinion, recent tests should tell skeptical Iranians that any hope of seeking an alternative to the resistance approach is "naive" or even "left-handed cooperation with the enemy . "
    Before the speech, some observers had noted the regime's seemingly hesitant response to the months of low-intensity but persistent unrest led by angry protesters over their living conditions and economic corruption. After political opponents used large-scale demonstrations as an opportunity to criticize Khamenei directly, some officials were concerned and warned leaders that continued delays in long-awaited reforms could obscure the future of the Islamic Republic or even cause its impending collapse. These fears were exacerbated when the regime significantly abstained from crackdowns that could backfire on protests.
    However, Khamenei's recent comments indicate that he is not disturbed by the unrest. For example, in order to calm supporters of the regime and boast of his defiance of foreign enemies and local opponents, his office sent a brief statement to the local media on 8 August after a meeting with a group of "Iranian cultural activists abroad." In response to a question by the unnamed activist who said supporters outside Iran were concerned about the future of the regime, Khamenei gave a firm answer he wanted everyone to hear: "They should not have any concern at all. No one can do anything  . "
    Corruption: Threat and Opportunity
    Iranians tend to regard systematic corruption in the country as a major source of economic chaos. Some see it as more destructive than international sanctions. Thus, the militants use frequent disturbances in this matter or even raise them as an excuse to harm a Rouhani government, interfere with its powers under the Iranian constitution, and launch mass propaganda that depicts these militants as real sympathizers with the suffering of the people. On August 3, for example, Ahmad al-Huda, a prominent imam in Mashhad, acting as Khamenei's representative in Khorasan Radavi province, described the protests as a justified reaction to the irresponsible attitude of the government: "Revolutionaries, take to the streets If your demands are not processed! "
    Indeed, the unrest could ultimately help Khamenei and his autocratic circle, provided they remain limited enough to be controlled and show no prospect of becoming a broader anti-regime movement while intimidating ordinary citizens enough to make them welcome additional domestic security measures . This kind of social unrest gives the regime power and legitimacy to impose more security in the public sphere, weaken civil society, and marginalize moderates. Tehran seems to believe that the current stage is a turning point, in which national security concerns are diminished by the successful domestic repression mechanism and the regional achievements of its multinational militia network. The more the regime - especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guards - believes it can free itself from the demands of politicians, democratic processes and general approval, the more it seeks to take full control of civil institutions, the religious establishment and other bodies.
    The Trump administration hopes that economic problems will push Iran toward a change in regime policy, if not a clear change of regime. Khamenei seems to agree, but his plan is to make the country more resistant to reform and engagement with the outside world, and to put more power in the hands of the most hardliners. If he can succeed in this plan, it will determine the future of Iran.
    Mehdi Khalji

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