The “political blockage” in Iraq overthrows the constitutional terms and threatens the cohesion of a

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[size=52]The “political blockage” in Iraq overthrows the constitutional terms and threatens the cohesion of alliances[/size]

Amid Shiite forces' fear of Turkey's increasing influence
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]The term “political blockage” is the last term circulating in Iraqi political circles since the results of the early legislative elections appeared during October 2021. The results of the elections shocked the Iraqi political forces, the winners and the losers. Most of the winners were surprised by their unexpected victory, and most of the losers were surprised by a loss they did not expect.

[size=45]There are many reasons and factors behind this. While the winners did not search for how they achieved their seats, despite the fact that the votes they obtained were less than the votes of some of the losers who got more votes, but won fewer seats, a conspiracy theory emerged, in which it was said that regional and international forces participated in it in order to win a party. for the loss of a party.
[size=45]Likewise, the analysis that was closer to logic and which says that the new election law enacted by the last Iraqi parliament and which adopts multiple constituencies and wins the highest votes is the reason for the discrepancy in results has not worked. Thus, those who handled the law intelligently through the candidates got higher seats with fewer votes and vice versa. However, this fact did not convince the objectors who slept on the street for more than two months as they submitted their appeals to the Federal Court.[/size][/size]
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]Former President Masoud Barzani casting his vote in 2018 ... and Muqtada al-Sadr after casting his vote in the October 2021 elections (Reuters)

[size=45]Objections to the results of the recent Iraqi legislative elections, and the sit-ins that followed, crept over the constitutional and legal periods for the formation of the government, starting with the election of the presidency of the parliament, then a new president of the republic, and the formation of the government through a candidate from the largest bloc.[/size]
[size=45]The periods and dates have crawled over each other. After everything was scheduled to be resolved in late December 2021, the only thing that could be resolved so far is the election of the Speaker of Parliament during the session that was held during the month of February, and thus the two major contracts remained, namely the position of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. . Here, we mention that the most prominent reasons that called for early elections and the dismissal of the government of former Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi are the mass movement that began in October 2019, and led to the killing of more than 600 demonstrators and civil activists, and the wounding of more than 24 thousand. However, the outcome so far is that everyone is approaching the constitutional period for the end of the parliamentary session, which is next month. Consequently, the idea of ​​early elections has been abandoned.[/size]
[size=45]Not only that, but in light of the "political blockage", which is an alternative to the old term "bottleneck" that represented the case of previous bottlenecks, indications go to say, that even perhaps during the next two months it will not be possible to solve the "complex" of the presidency of the republic and then assign Prime Minister. Although this “blockage” is dominant over everything, including the alliances that were formed after the results of the elections, these alliances (in particular, the Triple Alliance and the Coordination Framework Alliance) have become threatened, after each of them will not be able to achieve its goal... Is it a government A national majority... or a consensus government that accommodates all?[/size]
[size=45]Presidency knot[/size]
[size=45]In the context of what was known as the “post-2003 recipe”, which was and still is based on sectarian and ethnic quotas, the position of the President of the Republic has become for the Kurdish component, while the share of the Shiite component is the position of Prime Minister - which is the supreme executive authority in the country - while the Sunni component gets to the Presidency of Parliament.[/size]
[size=45]During the first three terms that started from 2005 to 2014, not to mention the transitional period 2003-2004, the position of the President of the Republic was being rotated by the Kurds between the two main parties in the Kurdistan region, i.e. the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani (died in 2013). When the National Union takes the position of the president of the republic, the party takes the main positions in the region, which are the presidency of the region and the presidency of the regional government. Indeed, this Kurdish-Kurdish “custom” continued, and did not constitute an obstacle at all to the rest of the constitutional entitlements until 2018. But before that, in 2014, after Talabani’s death, a kind of competition took place within the “Union” itself regarding the position between Dr. Barham Salih (the current president). Al-Gomhouria) Wad Fouad Masoum, the former president.[/size]
[size=45]Then, during the fourth parliamentary session 2018, the first signs of a dispute over the position of President of the Republic emerged between the two major Kurdish parties, the “Party” and the “Union,” which forced them to enter with two candidates, Barham Salih (the current president) and Fouad Hussein, the current foreign minister. As for the reason for the dispute, the "party" rejected Saleh's candidacy for the position. As a result, despite the pledges given by many Shiite leaders to the leader of the "party", Saleh was able to win the position, obtaining a large majority in Parliament. As a consequence, Saleh went to the Peace Palace as President of the Republic, while Fuad Hussein was rewarded with the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.[/size]
[size=45]However, with the recent elections, the Kurdish-Kurdish dispute was entrenched, and the conflict within the “Kurdish House” intensified. The victory of the leader of the "Sadr movement" Muqtada al-Sadr and his bloc (the Sadrist bloc) with the highest votes in parliament (74 deputies) came as a surprise to his Shiite opponents from other forces. While al-Sadr seemed to insist on forming a national majority government, “neither eastern nor western,” the dispute aggravated between him and the Shiite “coordinating framework” forces, which includes the “Fatah” coalition led by Hadi al-Amiri, the “state of law” led by Nuri al-Maliki, and “Asaib.” » led by Qais Khazali, "state forces" led by Ammar al-Hakim, and "Victory" alliance led by Dr. Haider al-Abadi. Hence, this situation was reflected on the other "houses"...negatively for the Kurds and positively for the Sunni Arabs.[/size]
[size=45]Impossible two-thirds majority[/size]
[size=45]Muqtada al-Sadr's insistence on the tripartite alliance that he brought together with the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani and the "Sovereignty Alliance" led by Muhammad al-Halbousi, the speaker of parliament, and Khamis al-Khanjar, a businessman, complicated the problem of choosing the disputed Kurdish president. The most prominent reason for this was the inability to secure the two-thirds majority required to pass the election of the President of the Republic, according to the interpretation of the Federal Supreme Court.[/size]
[size=45]Here, Massoud Barzani tried to resolve the crisis within the "Shiite House" in order to overcome the two-thirds obstacle, but he did not succeed. According to what Asharq Al-Awsat heard from an Iraqi politician, "Barzani's initiative, which was carried to the leader of the Sadrist movement by Nechirvan Barzani and Parliament Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi, was an attempt to break the ice twice, once between al-Sadr and al-Maliki, and once to dismantle the coordination framework." The politician continued, "The initiative included accepting al-Maliki and granting him the position of Vice President of the Republic, but the sharp intransigence towards al-Maliki led to the death of the initiative."[/size]
[size=45]On the other hand, the coalition of opponents (the “Coordination Framework” and the “National Union”), and their candidate, the current president, Barham Salih, even if they are not cohesive because they are not an official alliance, they will face the same problem… that is, we cannot guarantee a two-thirds majority. Therefore, in comparison to what appears to be a Shiite-Shiite conflict and Kurdish-Kurdish intransigence, and in light of the impossibility of consensus between the two parties, it appears that the crisis is sustainable, especially with the birth of other crises, including the war in Ukraine and its various repercussions on Iraq under a “caretaker government.” Not fully empowered. Here, to clarify, the conflict is not between all the Shiites and all the Kurds, but between a section of the Shiites and a section of the Kurds, and the hardening is not between all the Kurds and all the Shiites, but between a section of the Kurds who reject each other with a section of the Shiites who do not accept them.[/size]
[size=45]Sunni house unites[/size]
[size=45]On the other hand, within a few months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was keen to meet the two most prominent Iraqi Sunni leaders (Muhammad al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar) twice. Both times were after the last parliamentary elections were held on October 10, 2021.[/size]
[size=45]Al-Halbousi and Al-Khanjar did not live in the days of the great Sunni leaders who left Mashhad after 2003, or disappeared from it for one reason or another. None of those leaders were among the "founding fathers" of the post-Saddam Hussein regime, but the "founding fathers" of the regime were Shiites and Kurds only. Even when the “Governing Council” was formed, these founding fathers struggled to find Sunni leaders who could complete the scene of the new government called the “Governing Council” under American auspices and with the absolute leadership of the American civil ruler, Paul Bremer. At that time, building the new system required that it be based on ethnic and sectarian components (Shias, Sunnis and Kurds). But within a few years, the Shiite-Kurdish alliance began to crack due to differences over the implementation of the articles of the constitution, in particular, Articles 140 related to Kirkuk and the disputed areas and 111 related to oil and gas, as well as the method of power-sharing and other disputes.[/size]
[size=45]Meanwhile, the roles of Sunni leaders that emerged in the post-establishment period—such as Tariq al-Hashemi and Rafi al-Issawi, as well as Iyad al-Samarrai, the leader of the Islamic Party, Osama al-Nujaifi, the former parliament speaker, and Saleh al-Mutlaq—began to decline in various ways. Even Khaled Al-Hashimi was prosecuted and is still sentenced to death in absentia outside Iraq, while Rafie Al-Issawi is now following up on the pending cases regarding him… moving between investigation centers and the judiciary to prove his innocence. In 2013, huge demonstrations erupted in the western (Sunni) governorates of Iraq that lasted about a year before they were suppressed by the authorities at the time. Although the demonstrators presented demands that seemed legitimate, the authorities accused them at the time that ISIS was behind them.[/size]
[size=45]At that time, the name of Muhammad al-Halbousi had not emerged, but the name of Khamis al-Khanjar, a businessman and one of the tribal sheikhs in Anbar Province, had emerged. In 2014, Al-Halbousi became a deputy in the Iraqi parliament and head of the Parliamentary Finance Committee. Then he left parliament to become the governor of Anbar. Then in 2018, he returned to parliament and became its speaker at the age of 37. At that time, he was not only the youngest speaker of parliament in the history of Iraq, but he also became one of the most prominent players in the country's political equation.[/size]
[size=45]Meanwhile, the dagger was angry with a Shiite, before the scene changed after a short period of time to appear in a picture that seemed historical at the time with Nuri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri and a number of the most prominent Shiite leaders. It seemed like washing an old history and resuming another.[/size]
[size=45]For information, the relationship between Al-Halbousi and Al-Khanjar was not good, as a result of the struggle for influence in the western provinces. But after the 2021 elections, the scene completely changed with the change in results, and with it the roles of regional and international players. Likewise, Muqtada al-Sadr became a difficult figure. His prominence divided the "Shiite House" into two parts, the "Sadr movement" and the "coordinating framework."[/size]
[size=45]Returning to the Kurds, whose positions were unified towards the center or Baghdad, the largest sovereign position for them (the Presidency of the Republic) dismantled their power because of their rivalry over it, which deprived them of their old role as a “huge egg”. While there is no longer a “historical alliance” between them and the Shiites, but has now been replaced by a kind of rivalry due to the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s violation of the rule of constancy of the component “houses” built by the founding fathers (Shiites and Kurds), the new situation has weakened the “Shiite house” and exacerbated The Kurdish-Kurdish dispute.[/size]
[size=45]Thus, the scene in Ankara that brought together Al-Halbousi and the dagger - who appeared in one picture with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his intelligence director Fidan Haqan - was striking. Rather, it was "suspicious: for the Shiite forces. Here, political experts believe that Turkey has taken advantage of the decline in US-Iranian priorities regarding the Iraqi file, and was able to fill the void by unifying the Sunni house. On the other hand, the statements made by many Shiite leaders after the "quartet picture" in Ankara expressed fear that the Shiites would turn into a minority in the next government. This means, from the point of view of these leaders, that the Shiites will not be able to impose their desires in Parliament, and that Turkey will extend its influence and power with a large Sunni alliance, and a section of the Kurds may join it at a later stage.[/size]
[size=45]Baghdad: «Asharq Al-Awsat»[/size]
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