Is the Iraqi army fragile? A US report warns of the lack of will to fight and the occurrence of a “d

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[size=52]Is the Iraqi army fragile? A US report warns of the lack of will to fight and the occurrence of a “disaster”[/size]


[size=45]The American website “Low Fair” (Legal Affairs), which specializes in legal and security issues, wondered whether the Iraqi army was really ready to face any new challenges, especially with the United States ending its combat role at the end of 2021, and fears of a repeat of the American withdrawal experience in 2011, when it collapsed The Iraqi armed forces, which numbered 700,000 soldiers, three years later faced the attack of ISIS.[/size]
[size=45]The American report suggests that the United States begins a new phase with the Iraqi army and works slowly by learning from previous failures, and contributing to building the fighting will of the Iraqi army and developing its technical capabilities.[/size]
[size=45]In the report written by researcher Ben Konable, who published a book entitled “The Will of the Iraqi Army to Fight,” issued by the prominent American “Rand Institute,” he begins by saying that “while the United States retreats in the Middle East and seeks to confront Russia and China, it will rely heavily on partner military forces.[/size]
[size=45]However, the report warns that many times the United States has been able to accomplish little by training these partner forces, and that things have sometimes ended in disaster, describing what has happened with Iraq since 2003 as one of the worst American efforts regarding the Iraqi army. , warning that the fragility of the Iraqi army makes it vulnerable to collapse when it is subjected to a severe blow.[/size]
[size=45]In turn, the report suggests that the United States reduce its dependence on Iraqi Special Forces and other specialized military units, and review and rethink how the United States trains the Iraqi army at the broader level.[/size]
[size=45]Although the report indicated that the situation in Iraq had improved to the point that Washington ended its combat support missions in December 2021, it considered that Iraq “appears to be unstable, but compared to the previous years of chaos, it was relatively stable.” But he added, "But we've been here before."[/size]
[size=45]The report indicated that Iraq appeared in a very good condition at the end of 2011, when former US President Barack Obama announced that the US war in Iraq had ended, and Washington withdrew its combat forces at the end of that year, leaving behind a "well-equipped Iraqi military force with a total of more than 700,000 soldiers and police received their training from the West.”[/size]
[size=45]The report continued; "There was reason to believe that the Iraqis were ready to defend themselves, but this turned out not to be the case when the army was challenged by ISIS."[/size]
[size=45]The collapse of partner forces[/size]
[size=45]The report stated; In early 2014, three years after the United States withdrew, tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and paramilitary police abandoned Humvees, artillery pieces and armored vehicles, fleeing the confrontation with a small number of ISIS militants, adding that more than 19 brigades of The Iraqi soldiers and the federal police were disintegrated, allowing ISIS to seize about a third of the area of ​​Iraq, and impose their brutal rule on cities like Mosul, which did not end until the year 2017, lands for which the Americans had fought and their soldiers died.[/size]
[size=45]And the US Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, announced at the time that "the Iraqi forces did not show any will to fight."[/size]
[size=45]The report noted; That Iraq had obtained many billions of dollars worth of equipment and consultancy contracts, which turned out to be futile, as Washington was forced to return militarily, which brought its forces back into danger, as the costs of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria amounted to more than 14 billion dollars and caused 270 American deaths, in addition to non-collateral losses from outside the combat framework.[/size]
[size=45]The report considered; That if the United States and NATO's advisory mission want to avoid a repeat of the collapse of the Iraqi army, what they need is to "refocus their efforts on building Iraq's will to fight," a will that includes action and resolution to fight, action and perseverance when necessary.[/size]
[size=45]He added that the Iraqi army, since its formation in the early twentieth century, has struggled to build and maintain the fighting will, noting that the army, which was previously seen as the backbone of state-building in Iraq, has a fragile record, adding that despite that, "the army alone is the party which enjoys the national respect and the broad scope necessary to defend all of Iraq.”[/size]
[size=45]The will of the Iraqi army to fight (1921-2022)[/size]
[size=45]After the report referred to the wars fought by the Iraqi army during the 101 years of its history, it spoke of "many Iraqi soldiers fought bravely, but in many cases entire units collapsed and fled."[/size]
[size=45]The report dealt with events in which entire combat teams collapsed, as happened, for example, in 1986 during an attack by Iranian forces in the Faw Peninsula, and as in the Gulf War in 1991, when about 120,000 soldiers fled from the Iraqi army before the start of “Desert Storm”, and the surrender of about 80,000 others during the battles.[/size]
[size=45]The report concludes that "the failure of the Iraqis' will to fight caused Saddam Hussein's fighting power to be halved."[/size]
[size=45]And after the report pointed out that the Iraqi army participated in what it called “a series of counter-insurgency operations against the Kurds of Iraq”, it continued that in the past period, it fought battles against militants linked to Al-Qaeda (2003-2013) and against ISIS (2014 until now), where the will to fight was It declines and flows, but the defeat of al-Qaeda or ISIS, would not have been possible without the strong performance of many Iraqi military units.[/size]
[size=45]However, in 2004, army soldiers refused to fight in Fallujah, and in 2015 army and police units abandoned Ramadi in a collective manner in the face of the ISIS attack.[/size]
[size=45]The report concluded; That the fluctuating performance of the Iraqi forces contributed to "thwarting repeated US efforts to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Iraqis."[/size]
[size=45]fragile iraqi army[/size]
[size=45]The report clarified; Iraqi army units usually stick to their guns when everything is in their favour, and they fight better than most armies in the Middle East when they have extra forces, better equipment and the element of surprise, and they are facing a weak opponent.[/size]
[size=45]He continued, "When conditions are not favorable and they are surprised, or when their senior leaders falter, or find themselves on the defensive during the night, they are often broken."[/size]
[size=45]The report considered; The fragility of the Iraqi army's will to fight stems from a number of persistent cultural challenges, as power within military units is concentrated in the hands of a small number of senior commanders so that junior commanders (sergeants and lieutenants) are powerless, explaining that when there is not enough power in the hands of military leaders Youngsters, they fail just as much if they are to build up the fighting will.[/size]
[size=45]He also pointed out that "the paternalistic tendency in Iraqi society prevents individual adaptation," explaining that "the capabilities that are being acquired and the tendency towards adaptation, enhance military success."[/size]
[size=45]Therefore, the report considers that the social and organizational shortcomings of the Iraqi army are undermining the US-led effort to build up Iraqi forces after the 2003 invasion.[/size]
[size=45]The report then refers to the May 2003 decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority to dissolve the Iraqi army, which led to the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of former soldiers and many of Iraq's best military leaders, a decision that in some way contributed to the subsequent failures.[/size]
[size=45]While the report noted; To the fact that the Coalition Provisional Authority was established in August 2003, the new Iraqi army, which was a national military force born without a state serving it, and that the new army soldiers were not interested in fighting against their own people on behalf of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the report considered that “makers of American policy was applying a hasty version of Vietnamization (from Vietnam) to Iraq, with results that were not surprising.”[/size]
[size=45]He explained that counterproductive results appeared to Washington's attempts to exert intense political pressure to train and equip hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and police quickly so that they could withdraw.[/size]
[size=45]He added that Washington later invested heavily in "special units," noting that Iraqi leaders were always ready to strip regular units of their best soldiers in order to form specialized commando units, as Saddam Hussein did, for example, during the Iran-Iraq war when he formed the Republican Guard at the expense of units. the regular army, and there are no longer enough regular guard units to defend Iraq from invasion.[/size]
[size=45]The report stated that "at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the United States bet heavily on the Iraqi counter-terrorism apparatus, and what happened again is that the special units withdrew the best leaders and equipment while the army and police were in a state of stagnation and lost their will to fight," adding that after the collapse of In 2014, the United States doubled down on these bets, pouring more money and better training into the anti-terrorist apparatus.[/size]
[size=45]Although the report indicated that the Counter-Terrorism Service helped Iraqi forces stop the advance of ISIS in 2014 and 2015 and retake the city of Mosul in 2017, the Counter-Terrorism Service would not have succeeded at all without the direct support of the reconstituted Iraqi army units, He explained that the doctrine of collective combat is still valid, as the anti-terrorist apparatus can at best mobilize 20,000 soldiers, which is not enough to defend the country even against internal threats, nor against an organized enemy or a foreign army.[/size]
[size=45]That is why the report considered that “securing the protection of a country with a population of 40 million people on an area of ​​434,000 square kilometers in one of the most volatile regions in the world, requires a national army that can be relied upon.”[/size]
[size=45]The right approach[/size]
[size=45]The report called for a fundamental change in the way the United States deals with plans to support Iraq's security forces, moving from strengthening a small number of special units to improving the quality and capabilities of the broader Iraqi army, ie developing large numbers of reliable regular forces.[/size]
[size=45]Second, the report considered that building the will to fight in the Iraqi army will take many years, which will not reduce the need in the short term for advisers and funding, explaining that there is a need for necessary gradual and qualitative changes, which are needed to prevent a catastrophic setback from happening again.[/size]
[size=45]Among the actions the report suggests is working with Iraqi leaders to increase training for smaller leaders, developing a spirit of teamwork by developing the historical narratives of the Iraqi military, and building on the growing nationalist sentiments of the broader public.[/size]
[size=45]Translation: Shafak News Agency[/size]
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