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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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    Foreign Policy: Iran is pulling the rope of 'revenge'.. 3 proposals to keep Washington in the Iraq g

    Rocky
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    Foreign Policy: Iran is pulling the rope of 'revenge'.. 3 proposals to keep Washington in the Iraq g Empty Foreign Policy: Iran is pulling the rope of 'revenge'.. 3 proposals to keep Washington in the Iraq g

    Post by Rocky Fri Jun 25, 2021 8:29 am

    [size=30]Foreign Policy: Iran is pulling the rope of 'revenge'.. 3 proposals to keep Washington in the Iraq game
    [ltr]2021.06.25 - 11:44[/ltr]
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    With frequent indications of Iraq's regression in the priorities of the new administration in the White House, American observers point to the possibility of establishing a new phase, stressing that the situation in the country has not completely out of control, but they require that several steps be taken to "correct the course."  
      
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    An article published by "Foreign Policy" magazine, by Kenneth Pollack and Daniel Peltica, notes that "the long game in Iraq is possible to win through three simple proposals, with some concessions for the time being."  
    The article proposes, "Protection of movements against corruption and militias," abandoning the usual reservation in managing the democratic decline among aid recipients and seriously considering "Iraq's violations of democratic standards," as part of a plan that paves the way for a "democratic state and a prosperous economy."  
      
    Article text:  
      
    On June 17, after nearly a decade of trying, the US House of Representatives voted by a wide bipartisan margin to repeal the 2002 authorization for the use of military force, which authorized the invasion of Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the subsequent multi-year operations to stabilize the country. . For some, repeal (which still requires Senate action) would fulfill a long-overdue desire to reduce commitments to Iraq, which they see as a lost cause. For others, it will be the final nail in the coffin of a futile effort to transform Iraq into a functioning and prosperous democracy.  
      
    These beliefs are common, but they do not reflect the reality on the ground. Repealing the mandate is little more than a symbolic move, but Americans should be careful not to misinterpret its practical meaning. Iraq did not set. At least not yet.  
      
    Neither the courage of Iraqi protesters seeking political and economic reform nor the maneuvering of a handful of well-meaning leaders have corrected Iraq's course. Corruption is too widespread. Iraq's nominal allies are highly volatile. As always, Iran's henchmen are so powerful that even Iraq's best leaders, judges, soldiers, and police officers fear personal retaliation just for doing their job. External actors—mostly in Iran and some in Turkey—are intent on ensuring that Iraqis always walk a tightrope, fear the last mistake, and doubt that even the promised safety nets exist. The only conceivable entity to transform Iraq is the United States, but the costs of COVID-19 and the spread of Iraq as the days of Vietnam seem likely to sap any appetite in the Biden administration to bolster Iraq's foundations.  
      
    Fortunately, the United States can count on the Iraqis to bear most of the burden themselves. In fact, the international coalition on its way to being abolished is no longer relevant to the work that Washington needs in Iraq.  
      
    Another path forward - patient, light-footed, and steady - could mean a better Iraq for Iraqis and for the United States in the future. And it would be Iraq that could benefit the long-term bipartisan goal — as reflected in the pressure to abolish the Popular Mobilization Forces — of ending America's perennial wars in the Middle East and stabilizing or even neutralizing the region's most powerful forces.  
      
    For its part, the Biden administration insists that it will not repeat any of the foreign policy mistakes of its predecessors, and that it has learned the lesson about Iraq that unilateral retreat is a mistake. Indeed, it was Joe Biden himself as Vice President Barack Obama who oversaw the disastrous withdrawal in 2011 that laid the groundwork for the rise of the Islamic State. At the very least, it seems clear that the Biden administration itself is not hoping to get the ball rolling. As a result, Biden's national security team has already taken some important steps to cooperate closely with Baghdad: the first Middle East leader Biden described as president was Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and the US administration has already held a meeting of the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue in Washington, where Biden appeared . Another session is already in the works.  
      
    These are good steps, but they are only the beginning. Winning the long game in Iraq comes down to three simple propositions: It means building America's influence over time to bolster American influence. This means as weakening Iran in Iraq as possible to increase the cost of Iranian intervention, ultimately making it difficult to resist Iraqi and, ultimately, US efforts to fend off Iranian rule. This means waiting patiently and seizing opportunities - and seizing them to reinforce the original Iraqi forces.  
      
    But for these proposals to work, the United States must be prepared to stay in the game. Iran has proven its ability to play even a weak hand well, but what gave Tehran that advantage is that its proxies come to work every day. Thus, the entire US national security apparatus must prepare itself to remain engaged in Iraq, including whenever the United States inevitably loses tactical battles to Iran or corrupt Iraqis. At present, there are only a few thousand US troops in the country, and nearly all of them train the Iraqi security forces and provide advice, logistical and intelligence support. Another unit provides security for the rest, while only a small percentage supports direct action against ISIS remnants.  

    Since former US President Donald Trump ordered the killing of Iranian leader Qassem Soleimani and the paw of his Iraqi primate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Iran has made forcing American forces out of Iraq a priority. However, it is clear that the overthrow of US forces is an Iranian rather than an Iraqi priority. Most Iraqis support the presence of US forces, either because they see it as a path to a more professional Iraqi army or because it is seen as a critical check to rein in Iran.  

      
    With the exception of the most submissive Iranians, Iraqis unanimously point out that a name change for the US military mission is all they need to justify keeping it despite the Iraqi parliament's vote to expel US forces last year. This should be easy and even easier if the alliance is eventually abolished. This means saying that there are no US forces that have a combat mission in Iraq. It may also mean abandoning operations against the Islamic State from Iraqi soil, but this is a small price to pay. At this point, hunting down the Islamic State's tusks could be the lowest priority for US forces in Iraq given the terrorist organization's currently fragmented and weak state.  
      
    In contrast, what should become a higher priority for US military forces is the primary protection of Iraq's political leaders. One of the hardest problems that well-meaning Iraqi leaders like Kazemi, President Barham Salih, and others have faced when trying to curb corruption and Iranian-backed militias is the threat of violent retaliation against them and their families. Iraqi Security Forces leaders are under similar threat, designed to dissuade them from fulfilling their constitutionally mandated responsibilities to protect the government, according to legitimate orders, and to arrest Iranian proxies or other criminals. Washington has assured Baghdad that it will provide military support - if requested - in these specific cases. This is important, and this commitment should be resourced and maintained, but it is not sufficient.  
      
    The Iraqi leaders' need for protection is not an easy problem to solve. Because US forces are no longer present in Iraqi cities, militias, criminals, and foreign agents have a clearer path to beating independent politicians. Greater intelligence cooperation can always help (although the United States is already ahead of what it knows), but real progress may require greater displays of force by U.S. security forces and closer cooperation with Iraqi leaders. In Lebanon, leaders have been killed with impunity for decades without fear of justice or reprisals, constantly undermining any revival of democracy or the rule of law; The United States is interested in ensuring that this pattern does not repeat in Iraq.  
      
    One of the most useful ways in which the United States can expand its outreach to Iraq and build on its comparative advantage is to focus more on economic relations. Iraqis routinely complain that the United States focuses too much on security issues and not enough on economic issues. Washington provides nearly half a billion dollars annually in various assistance critical to the defense and development of Iraq. But the Iraqis also want more trade, technical expertise and other forms of purely economic assistance. In short, many seek not handouts but deeper economic engagement, and there are many ways in which the United States can show its recognition.  
      
    For example, although the current strategic dialogue between Washington and Baghdad includes economic considerations, the name implies a security concern. One easy solution is to turn the economic components into a "discrete economic dialogue between the United States and Iraq." Even more useful, however, is the creation of a permanent US-Iraq Joint Committee on Economic Cooperation modeled on the US-Saudi Committee of the same name. The latter was established in the 1970s to enable US economic and financial experts to help Riyadh use its oil wealth effectively for its modernization. The money was entirely Saudi. What the United States has brought is its knowledge, connections, and integrity. The committee played an essential role in building roads, airports, factories, petrochemical facilities, and even entire cities such as Yanbu and Jubilee.  
      
    The Iraqi government will have to submit project proposals to this joint committee for economic cooperation. From the US point of view, the ideal system would simply require all projects referred to the Joint Commission to comply with US anti-corruption regulations.  
      
    Finally, the United States must overcome its usual reticence to manage the democratic backsliding among aid recipients and its allies and forcefully advocate Iraq's violations of democratic norms. The United States has met Iraqi democracy, as it is, and cannot completely abdicate its responsibility. Indeed, one of America's worst moments came in 2010, when Washington failed to prevent the theft of Iraq's national elections. The disastrous slide of Iraqi politics into a renewed sectarian civil war in 2014 was partly the result of this mistake.  
      
    Washington's historical role still carries weight with public opinion and politicians in Iraq. The United States should also be prepared to suspend various forms of economic and diplomatic support when Iraqi leaders undermine their democracy. By the same token, when Iraq takes positive steps that promote good governance, the United States should be prepared to increase aid, even in small amounts. And Iraqis must believe that the risk of doing the right thing will be recognized and rewarded, especially by the United States.  
      
    All of this together could slow Iraq's decline, but it is unlikely to reverse its course. As has been the case for the past 18 years, Iraq has the elements of a viable democracy and a thriving economy. American mistakes and Iranian hatred have made those goals much more difficult to reach. But it is not out of reach if the United States works with honorable Iraqis to establish its path forward.  
      
    This may not sound like an exciting call to arms, but it is a realistic way forward through the difficult circumstances in which the United States and its Iraqi allies now find themselves. More importantly, it will push the Middle East into a place where military intervention is not the only hope for freedom and prosperity.  
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