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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

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I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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    Foreign Policy: 5 factors that led to the "failure" of Muqtada al-Sadr's project in Iraq

    Rocky
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    Foreign Policy: 5 factors that led to the "failure" of Muqtada al-Sadr's project in Iraq Empty Foreign Policy: 5 factors that led to the "failure" of Muqtada al-Sadr's project in Iraq

    Post by Rocky Sat 12 Mar 2022, 8:22 am

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    Foreign Policy: 5 factors that led to the "failure" of Muqtada al-Sadr's project in Iraq
    12 March 2022
    Ultra Iraq - Editorial Team
    Recent political developments indicate a rapprochement between the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, and his rival, Nuri al-Maliki, as well as the leaders of the coordination framework to reach a settlement on the form of the next government, which means that al-Sadr has withdrawn from the bet of the majority government.
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    The report explains that several factors were behind Muqtada al-Sadr's "failure" to break the political norm based on consensus
    Since the announcement of the preliminary results of the elections, al-Sadr has been chanting the phrase "neither eastern nor western... a national majority government", in a clear expression of his desire to break the prevailing political custom based on the appointment of a consensual prime minister by the Shiite poles since 2005.
    But al-Sadr may have had to give up his broad title of "reform" to accept again a compromise candidate, as [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.] indicate, which is indicated by a report published by " [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.] " magazine entitled "Why al-Sadr failed to reform Iraq."
    The report, translated by "Ultra Iraq", indicates that al-Sadr retreated after successive strikes from his opponents in the coordination framework and "direct interference from the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei", in addition to the reluctance of al-Sadr's partners in the tripartite alliance based on the latter's positions.
    The report concludes that reliance on the leader of the Sadrist movement to start a new political phase with different rules collided with "the ability and flexibility of the Iraqi regime, apparently weak and unanimously motivated, to confront change."
    Text of the report without action:

    Many observers expected last October's Iraqi elections to be a potential turning point in the country's long struggle to find stability since 2003. Instead, the drawn-out government formation process saw political violence against opponents, including mutual assassinations in the south. , bombings of political offices and those associated with them, and even an attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister. It witnessed arming the judiciary to target opponents with lawsuits and to exclude candidates. Foreign powers, including Iran, also intervened directly to prevent regime change .
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    All this indicates that change is not on the horizon for Iraq. The country remains stuck in familiar cycles of violence with no clear way out .
    Some experts have found this particularly disappointing because the election results initially hinted at change. Populist Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr defeated his rivals by a wide margin, winning 73 seats. His rivals in the previous elections, the Iran-aligned Fatah alliance, lost 31 seats and now have only 17. Its other rival, the State of Law coalition led by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, has only 35 seats. Al-Sadr was widely expected to play the role of kingmaker .
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    Foreign Policy: The coordination framework resorted to violence in attempts to repel al-Sadr and his allies from the majority government project
    Sensing an opportunity for radical change, the Sadrists called for an end to the consensual system of governance, in which all parties divide the state among themselves at the expense of corruption and stagnation. Instead, al-Sadr insisted on forming a majority government. The key was to exclude his old rival and Iran ally, Maliki. In changing its own policy, the United States now supports al-Sadr, and sees his rise as an opportunity to expel Iranian influence and change Iraqi politics .
    To reshape Iraqi politics, Sadr's majority-based campaign required an alliance—the Triple Alliance—with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which had become the most powerful Kurdish party, and the Sovereignty Bloc, representing the recently united Sunnis. The coalition passed its first real test, on January 9, when its candidate for Parliament Speaker, Muhammad al-Halbousi, won a very clear majority with 200 votes .
    But the opposition coordination framework led by al-Maliki and al-Fateh, with the support of Iran, still has the option of violence. Fatah mobilized its members and fighters to organize the protests, and closed the main entry points to the government area and judicial institutions. The Sadrists quickly realized that their armed group - Saraya al-Salam - was no equal in terms of manpower and weapons for a broader armed conflict. With the government forces' unwillingness and inability to officially intervene, the coordinating framework demonstrated its coercive power .
    Direct violence between the Sadrists and groups allied with Iran, specifically Asaib Ahl al-Haq, escalated during the months of government formation. In Maysan, an Iraqi province bordering Iran, each side targeted the other, leading to a series of mutual assassinations of Sadrists and local officials affiliated with Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. On November 7, 2021, armed groups launched drone strikes on the residence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi — seen as a close ally of al-Sadr. For the first time in Iraq since 2003, an incumbent prime minister was the target of an assassination attempt. The next day, Al-Kadhimi decided to consult with the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella network of armed groups linked to the Al-Fateh Alliance, and their allies to de-escalate the situation .
    The losing parties also targeted the main parts of the tripartite alliance led by al-Sadr. The groups launched attacks against the KDP headquarters in Baghdad and Kirkuk, Iraq, as well as against banks and companies affiliated with the party. They also attacked Sunni political headquarters in Baghdad and Anbar Governorate in Iraq, and even fired missiles at one of al-Halbousi's private residences in Anbar. This violence was successfully used to instill fear in the hearts of all those who thought of cooperating with al-Sadr .
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    Opponents of the Triple Alliance have also resorted to lawsuits and legal action - working with their allies within the judiciary - to delay and disrupt the majority government. The day after the elections, Al-Fateh leader Hadi Al-Amiri, shocked by the result, announced that he would file complaints alleging voter fraud. This would turn into a protracted process aimed at discrediting the election result .
    But while the dispute over the elections has delayed the ratification of the election results, more complex lawsuits have served as an effective way to disrupt the Sadr alliance itself. When the Triple Alliance put forward Hoshyar Zebari as a presidential candidate for a majority government, the coordination framework worked to bring back old corruption cases that questioned Zebari's candidacy. The judiciary ruled out Zebari, who was approved by parliament, which dealt a blow to pressure to form a majority government.
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    Foreign Policy: Federal Court rulings obstructed Al-Sadr's project to form a majority government
    Working with incumbent President Barham Salih, the coordinating framework also promoted a statutory provision that Parliament requires a two-thirds quorum for any vote on the presidency. This means that an agreement is needed behind the scenes, ensuring the continuation of the consensual system of governance .
    On February 15, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that the KRG oil and gas law was unconstitutional, meaning the central government can cancel all KRG oil contracts, as well as hold Erbil responsible for past oil revenues. Although this conflict lasted for years, many saw the timing of the ruling as a direct retaliation from the KDP for its support of the majority government .
    The same court nullified the Prime Minister's Anti-Corruption Commission as unconstitutional. This effectively put an end to the work of Iraq's most aggressive anti-corruption unit, which the Sadrists took advantage of to go after Maliki and rivals in the Fatah Alliance .
    Iran has historically been an important kingmaker in shaping Iraqi governments. In 2010, for example, Iranians brought their opponents Sadr and Maliki together shortly after the country's civil war to form a consensus government. This year, Iran was without its main mediator, Qassem Soleimani. In the past, Soleimani was key to ensuring consensus. Instead, Esmail Qaani favored a different approach. He wanted to stay out of the infighting and was willing to accept the wills of the Iraqi parties. This change in approach pitted Qaani against other Iranian elements who were more wary of pushing al-Sadr toward majority power .
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    As months passed without results, Qaani's plan collapsed. He has been sidelined and has become a mere messenger of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has now decided to intervene directly. Tehran's policy was to target all members of the Triple Alliance. Khamenei sent letters to Qaani to deliver to the KDP and the Sunnis, to discourage and threaten their role in the Sadr campaign. Leaders from both the KDP and Sunni parties have confided to the report's authors that Iran is taking a more active role, and they are concerned .
    Another concern was the mistrust of Sadr himself among his allies. Al-Halbousi and the KDP increasingly believe that Sadr has taken too great a risk by alienating powerful political opponents and their Iranian allies. They also fear that al-Sadr is not a reliable ally, noting that he has abandoned his coalition's presidential candidate, Zebari, after facing corruption allegations .
    Meanwhile, some senior Sadrists feel uneasy about the KDP's nationalist alliance, a tension exacerbated by the oil and gas rule. A senior Sadrist recently pointed out to the authors of the report that there is reason to doubt whether the KDP and Sunnis fully understood and agreed with Sadr's political vision .
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    [size=21]Foreign Policy: Khamenei decided to intervene personally through messages conveyed by Qaani to al-Sadr's allies to deter them from continuing their project.     [/size]
    Sadr has also lost significant ideological power. There was a time when Sadr convinced many Iraqis that he was a man for reform. In 2016, he occupied the Green Zone to protest corruption, even though he has hundreds of close allies attached to it. But in the past few years, and especially since his movement took a leading role in quelling a protest movement in October 2019, al-Sadr has lost his ideological power to convince Iraqis that he is a reformer. Last year, hospital fires that killed more than a hundred people were linked to corruption in the Iraqi Ministry of Health — widely known as the Sadrist-dominated ministry. While he may have won the election, Sadr has received fewer votes than in previous elections and is increasingly unpopular among younger voters.
    Al-Sadr's attempt to impose his vision of political reform - under the pretext of fundamentally changing the nature of the Iraqi political system - did not succeed. Electoral power is only one component of the equation that determines the composition of the government. So the seemingly weak and unanimously driven Iraqi regime has once again proven its resilience in the face of change .
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