The Washington Institute publishes the most serious expectations in the event of Qatar has lost its

The Washington Institute publishes the most serious expectations in the event of Qatar has lost its patience

Arab and international   Wednesday , July 12, 2017


Publication of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a report in which he talked about the most serious expectations if the beleaguered countries stepped up to Qatar procedures and lost patience with Qatar

The crisis does not appear among the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the one hand, and a member of the state «GCC» Qatar on the other hand, no signs of abating. Having sent its response to Qatar on the thirteen demands contained in the list submitted to the Government of Doha last month, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE have expressed during the meeting gathered in Cairo on the fifth of July regret over the country response "negative" on the list of demands, announcing the continuation of the restrictions that had been imposed.

The origins of tensions back to decades ago - and perhaps to entire generations in the eyes of the major parties - but it is unclear why the sudden eruption in May / May with the severance of diplomatic relations and an end to the air, sea and land links. It's because the alleged - that the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has made statements loyal to Iran - remains a place of heated conflict. Because of the available knowledge, it seems that both sides were apparently preparing for such a split for months.

If such a quarrel took place, which seems trivial in the face of, and hardly betrays a lack of maturity of between neighboring countries in Africa or Southeast Asia, it may have been minimal consequences. But it is different in the Arabian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter in the world, Qatar is the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas in the world, noting that all the parties directly involved in the dispute is Washington's allies, while at least friendlier countries, and most obviously Russia and Iran, is on the sidelines, and ready to take advantage of the crisis.

If not back down Saudis and Emiratis and Qataris [their positions] and the United States continued to Torjhaa between the tendency of US President to Riyadh and fears its senior officials from step Saudi Arabia, and thus do not find Washington a way to mediate in this crisis and to reach a compromise, it is possible to expand this ordeal The spread [quickly]. According to some reports, may try to Saudis and Emiratis applying a secondary boycott of the countries that trade with Qatar, or strengthening the military through their pressure, threatening to impose a naval blockade or the mobilization of the border. In this regard, the Middle East analyst Theodore Karasik said on July 2 that may have been seen taking direct military action until the Turkey sends its troops to Qatar to conduct training was planned in advance. According to the magazine "Foreign Policy" last week, the Qatari foreign minister spoke about his country's asylum to the judiciary against what he called "illegal blockade".



So would any additional steps by the Saudi and Emirati sides to generate a violent response from Qatar if the Doha felt that all means of settlement became closed. The most obvious response would be to resort to the UN Security Council, which will open the way for Russia to automatically permanent membership to intervene directly in the affairs of the Gulf after two years of successful intervention in Syria.

That would put the United States also in a difficult position. Either address any move in the United Nations, or continue to swing, or engage in earnest in resolving the crisis. It is possible that the latter option will lead to a happy result; otherwise, may play Qatar diplomatic leaves with some window parties, such as Russia and Iran, which does not support Thtman security system in the region led by the United States. In fact, the unhappy memories of the existence of the Ottoman century ago have vanished in Doha. Today Turkey has become a useful partner, as the government had enough Ankara Saudis and Emiratis demand the closure of the Turkish base in Qatar.

Even the most dangerous track is playing the Qatar military leaves. So we could start with the United States, which has security cooperation agreements with Qatar dating back to 1992 and 2013, and under which the United States used "many air base" as a dynamic center of strikes and command / control in the region. These agreements have been provided, either implicitly or explicitly, that the host country can "call" the United States to help if the country faced a security threat. While these commitments remain vague and are not legally binding, but they are (ie under the "Strategic Framework Agreement" between the United States and Iraq) deserve [to be activated in emergency situations similar to the organization of «Islamic State» attack in Iraq in 2014



While US policy was characterized by the ambiguity of this crisis, almost certainly not the bias of the United States, along with Qatar. But this may push Doha to restrict the use of the United States for "many base", while up operations against the organization «Islamic State» - which is controlled from that rule, and in some cases its launch from there - to a crucial point. Indeed, the most serious matter, is the likelihood of Qatar to Russia or Iran to seek military support if the Doha found itself trapped and unable to obtain United Nations support or the United States, and this is in line fully with Qatar's sovereign rights to seek this support and the rights of Russia or Iran Introducing. It is contrary to the logic is the idea that the United States might try to respond militarily to such a move, even if it led to the presence of Russian troops in the Gulf, and the spread of Iranian forces near the Shiite population in Bahrain, Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis and UAE diplomats experienced and can expect such a possibility as likely, but they went ahead Qatar to boycott any event. Perhaps this move reflects the key roles played by non-diplomatic parties - any new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, who was Living up marginally by all regarding the crisis, and the Crown Prince of ambition Prince Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi, the UAE capital, and bi-Prince and Prince parent in Doha, where he keeps the father of Tamim and the continued presence [through its involvement in national politics.

Perhaps Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prince Mohammed bin Zayed thought that Qatar would fall, but perhaps they also believe that Trump's management will provide diplomatic and military cover against any external support for Qatar. If so, this may be wrong. Apart from the US concerns understandable style of the Saudi initiative -alamaratneh and motivation, as well as military rights of the United States in the "many base," Washington remains restricted - as is the case in Syria - frequency long-term direct intervention in the countries-nation is opposed to its government.

Even if this terrible scenario has not happened already, the mere possibility of its occurrence illustrates the perilous stage reached by the region with respect to this crisis.

James F. Jeffrey is a former US ambassador in Iraq and Turkey, and is currently "Philip Solondz" outstanding fellow at the Washington Institute, focusing on regional diplomacy and US military strategy, as well as Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

He has previously worked as an assistant US president and deputy national security adviser to President George W. Bush's administration, where he focused on Iran, in particular.

Simon Henderson is a fellow "Baker" and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute, and co-author of the Political Institute in 2017 memoir "Re-building alliances and counter-threats in the Gulf."

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