Obsession with electoral promotion dominates the “framework” and a proposal to prevent Al-Sudani fro

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[size=52]Obsession with electoral promotion dominates the “framework” and a proposal to prevent Al-Sudani from a second term[/size]

[size=45]Baghdad / Tamim Al-Hassan[/size]
[size=45]The recent differences appear within the coordination framework forces according to intersecting political sources, all related to the issue of early promotion of elections.[/size]
[size=45]Some parties in the Shiite coalition believe that it has lost an important force that may increase its balance in the upcoming elections, which is control over the executive apparatus.[/size]
[size=45]Prime Minister Muhammad al-Sudani is seen as moving the cabinet reshuffle file and may use the budget within the framework of electoral promotion.[/size]
[size=45]Some Shiite forces may be reassured if al-Sudani is restricted or certain conditions are imposed on him, and it may seem more equitable if the latter quickly changes the governors.[/size]
[size=45]The file of the conservatives is more extensive than the Shiite-Shiite differences, as Sunni interests and the struggle for the position of Speaker of Parliament mix in it.[/size]
[size=45]And in a strange proposal, but it is put forward, according to what a politician close to the coordination framework says, that “there is a hypothesis that says that Al-Sudani pledges to the Shiite parties that he will not get a second term!”[/size]
[size=45]This restriction, according to what the politician, who asked not to be named, says, "may reassure some concerned forces about the expansion of the prime minister and calm the uproar about the cabinet reshuffle and the doubts about the rest of the files."[/size]
[size=45]The origin of the dispute within the coordination framework goes back more than 6 months ago when it was agreed to prevent the first line in the "framework", most notably Nuri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law, from heading the current government.[/size]
[size=45]At that time, the team of what later became known as the “generational displacement team” within the Shiite coalition won the position of prime minister to the third line of the two parties.[/size]
[size=45]However, according to the information, this agreement contained clauses that were not announced, which is that the selection of the Sudanese prime minister will depend on the latter remaining a “loyal soldier of the framework.”[/size]
[size=45]In addition, Al-Maliki will postpone his desire to obtain the position of prime minister until the test of "the sincerity of the Sudanese" or the return of the first to win the position.[/size]
[size=45]Mostly, when Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist movement, decided to retire and the “framework” formed the government, it delegated all Shiite forces, Qais al-Khazali, to confront al-Maliki, with the exception of the wings of Ammar al-Hakim (leader of wisdom) and Haider al-Abadi (leader of victory), and the two have limited seats in parliament.[/size]
[size=45]After that, it appeared that Khazali was the one who was enthusiastic about al-Sudani and nominated him to head the government, which is contrary to what the Sadrists thought, at least, that the latter is the shadow of al-Maliki, according to what Salih al-Iraqi, who is close to al-Sadr, wrote in a tweet last summer.[/size]
[size=45]And the first clash between Al-Maliki and Al-Sudani was in what was leaked about the interference of the League of the Righteous (Khazali) in the work of the Ministry of Oil of the State of Law, and Al-Maliki threatened at the time to dismiss his three ministers from the government in protest of these interventions.[/size]
[size=45]And again, when the prime minister retracted his dismissal of the governors of Najaf and Dhi Qar, who are affiliated with al-Sadr, during the latter’s cancellation of a series of decisions taken in the last year of Mustafa Al-Kazemi’s previous government (caretaker government).[/size]
[size=45]Al-Maliki appeared in a television interview and confirmed that he did not agree to exclude the conservatives, then returned a few weeks later to say in a second interview that "the Sudanese promised me to change the conservatives within the next two or three months."[/size]
[size=45]After that, leaks reported that the most objecting to the 3-year budget was al-Maliki, for fear that al-Sudani would exploit the huge sums (200 trillion dinars in the 2023 budget) in the elections.[/size]
[size=45]Finally, Al-Maliki denied, in an interview on a local station, the existence of a cabinet reshuffle, despite Al-Sudani's announcement of his insistence on changing some ministers.[/size]
[size=45]"Until this moment, the situation is stable and there is no official change in positions," said Aref al-Hamami, a representative of State of Law, confirming the coalition's rejection of the government amendment.[/size]
[size=45]Thaer Mukhaif, the other representative of Maliki's coalition, said earlier that "the Sudanese must ensure that the parties' quotas are not exceeded in the ministerial change."[/size]
[size=45]This is contrary to what al-Sudani said, who confirmed in the last television interview that the cabinet reshuffle is not the “mood of the leaders,” as it seemed as if he was responding to al-Maliki.[/size]
[size=45]So far, there is a conflict regarding the ministerial reshuffle and the ministers included in the change, while Al-Sudani did not reveal the number and names of the targeted ministers.[/size]
[size=45]And obsession with the elections greatly dominates the work of the Shiite parties, according to what a member of parliament says in an interview with (Al-Mada).[/size]
[size=45]And the deputy, who asked not to be named, confirms that: “The conservatives are one of the tools of electoral promotion, and there are differences over the date and number of governors who will be replaced.”[/size]
[size=45]According to the deputy, "Some parties want to replace the governors before the local elections that are supposed to take place before the end of the year, but Al-Sudani was supporting the idea of ​​postponing this decision until after the elections, but he may back down due to pressure."[/size]
[size=45]In his last interview with the prime minister, he said that he intends to replace some governors, without giving details about their number or names.[/size]
[size=45]According to the reported news, it seems that al-Maliki aspires to obtain the position of governor of Dhi Qar and Najaf in addition to Maysan, where the "frame" is trying to isolate the governors who have been in office for more than a year, and this applies to the governor of Maysan, Ali Dawai, who is close to al-Sadr.[/size]
[size=45]In addition, State of Law feels that he has lost the tour of the governor of Babylon, who went to "Al-Asa'ib" when the Sudanese Aslan Al-Jubouri was assigned to act by proxy more than 5 months ago, and the governor is now on the lists of those included in the change.[/size]
[size=45]On the other hand, the conservative file ignited a conflict between the Sunni forces, as the Taqaddam party, led by Speaker of Parliament Muhammad al-Halbousi, no longer adhered to the current governor of Anbar, Ali Farhan, due to news of the latter's coup against al-Halbousi.[/size]
[size=45]According to leaked information, Al-Halbousi is now pushing the former governor of Anbar, Suhaib Al-Rawi, in exchange for Qasim Al-Fahdawi, the former Minister of Electricity, who is nominated by the Anbar Alliance first, the rival of Al-Halbousi, who is working with the Azm Alliance in Baghdad to replace the Speaker of Parliament.[/size]
[size=45]On the other side, Najm al-Jubouri, the governor of Nineveh, is also threatened with dismissal, and alternative names appear, such as the governor and former deputy, Mansour al-Mureed, who is close to Faleh al-Fayadh, the head of the Hashd, and the former defense minister, Khaled al-Obeidi.[/size]
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