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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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Does the Iranian regime kill Muqtada al-Sadr?

rocky
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Does the Iranian regime kill Muqtada al-Sadr? Empty Does the Iranian regime kill Muqtada al-Sadr?

Post by rocky Tue Jan 18, 2022 8:18 am

[size=39]Does the Iranian regime kill Muqtada al-Sadr?
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Hussein Abdul Hussein
January 18 2022
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Followers of politics in Lebanon are circulating that on the day former Prime Minister Saad Hariri went to an agreement with Michel Aoun to elect the latter as president of the country, Hariri suggested to Aoun that their parliamentary blocs and Hariri’s allies, and these blocs constituted the two-thirds majority in the “House of Representatives”, pass a law that forces “ Hezbollah” demanded to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese army and disband the party’s militia. Aoun replied: “They are killing me (that is, Hezbollah).”
As in Lebanon, as well as in Iraq, violence and assassinations are used by the militias loyal to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to prevent the issuance of laws or government decisions that stipulate their dissolution and handing over of their weapons. But the game in Iraq is more difficult for Tehran, as it is easy to buy the Shiites of Lebanon, who number one million, but it is difficult to buy the Shiites of Iraq, who number 15 million and enjoy oil revenues and a religious authority higher than Khamenei’s.
Thus, Iraq's Shiites rose up against the Wali al-Faqih regime, and inflicted a crushing parliamentary electoral loss on it. In October, the number of seats for Iran's cronies fell to about a third, while Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc won the largest parliamentary bloc.
 Iran's cronies - organized in six parties who called their union the "coordinating framework" - tried to blow up the elections and did not recognize their results or their legitimacy, but the international recognition of the legitimacy of the elections, judicial scrutiny, recounting and counting, all proved the results and the Iranian defeat.
Then Al-Sadr contributed to deepening the "framework" crisis, as he began negotiating with the rest of the blocs in the Iraqi "House of Representatives" with the aim of forming a governing coalition. Thus, the "framework" found itself on the sidelines while the remaining forces allyed without it - rather against it - so Iran's stooges tried to form the largest parliamentary bloc in union with al-Sadr, under the title of Shiite reunification.
But sectarianism did not blind al-Sadr’s eyes. His disagreement with Iran’s allies is deep and radical, as al-Sadr has repeatedly announced that the task of the next government will be to dissolve all militias in the country, and limit the use of force to the security institutions that follow the orders of the elected government.
The disbanding of the militias would undermine the model of the Iranian Republic, which is based on an auxiliary state whose leader, the guide, its militia army, and the elected state and its weak army run behind the scenes, a model imposed by Shiite political Islam in Iran, and later in Lebanon and Yemen, and it is still seeking to impose the same model in Iraq.
Thus, the entire policy of the Iranian regime in Iraq and Lebanon becomes based on ensuring the survival of the militias, a presence fraught with legal risks due to its unconstitutionality, which always pushes Tehran either to try to win the elections and control the parliaments and governments of the state that it seeks to enslave, or - in the event of losing the elections - Disrupting the constitutional process, stopping the formation of governments, and obstructing the issuance of decisions to dissolve militias.
In the Lebanese experience, after Hezbollah lost the elections and the elected government issued decisions to dissolve aspects of the party's militia, the party resorted to violence in a quick round of violence against its opponents.
Iran's violence is the last solution, preceded by attempts to obstruct, just as Iran has obstructed the election of Lebanon's president and the election of a parliament. Today, "Hezbollah" is disrupting the Lebanese cabinet to force Lebanon's judiciary to stop an investigation that may show the enormity of the weapons storage that led to a catastrophic explosion in the port of Beirut two years ago.
In Iraq, al-Sadr is aware of Tehran's maneuver and rejects it on the basis of a patriotic principle, based on massive popular support that gave him the largest bloc to carry out the task of disbanding the militias. In the opening session of the new “House of Representatives”, the pro-Tehran president withdrew, and when the session did not stop, the “framers” withdrew, but their small number did not break the quorum, so the session continued, and re-elected the Sunni Muhammad al-Halbousi as Speaker of Parliament for the second time, despite opposition Tehran was elected to him, and two deputies were elected to him, a Shiite from the Sadrist bloc and a Kurd from the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which is opposed to the Iranian regime.
This is how the features of an inclusive, national Iraqi alliance began to form without Iran's stooges, which angered Tehran, so its stooges immediately exported tweets in which they threatened civil war if Iraq proceeded without them. In the following days, the headquarters of al-Halbousi's party was attacked with grenades, and the headquarters of the second Sunni party, which is affiliated with Khamis Khanjar, was attacked with a booby-trapped march, and the offices of the "Kurdistan Democratic Party" were attacked, and the Kurdish Peshmerga in the north were attacked by rockets, and a leader in The Kurdish Party of the assassination in Baghdad.
The militias loyal to Tehran had announced their responsibility months ago for their attempt to assassinate the caretaker prime minister, Mustafa Al-Kazemi, because, due to his failure to run in the elections, he appeared to be neutral, sane, and measured, and thus bestowed his credibility on the elections that were rejected by Iran.
This time, Muqtada al-Sadr is standing in the way of Tehran's attempts to maintain its militias in Iraq, which means that al-Sadr's life is threatened.
It goes without saying that Sadr's Shiites do not protect him from Iranian violence, as Tehran has a long history of targeting Shiite clerics who threatened Iranian influence. Some believe that the Khomeinist revolution played a role in the disappearance of the Lebanese cleric Musa al-Sadr (one of Muqtada's Iranian cousins). 
As for the most obvious Iranian roles, it was in the killing of Abdul Majeed Al-Khoei, son of the late reference Abu Al-Qasim, and then the assassination of the cleric Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, following their return to Iraq. Both men enjoyed wide Iraqi Shiite popularity, as well as relations with Washington, which threatened the Iranian regime's project to control Iraq.
Muqtada al-Sadr this time crossed the red lines of the Iranian regime, which is that if he proceeded to form a parliamentary majority government, instead of the Iranian-imposed "national unity" government, his life might be in danger, which the man seems to realize as he reduced his public appearance, and moved to Al-Hananah in Najaf, where the militias protecting the shrines of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani prevail, and they are defensive local militias that do not engage in bullying or attempts to seize the state as their state counterparts.
It is expected that Al-Sadr, along with Iraqis of all shades and colors, will incur Tehran and its allies in Iraq with parliamentary, governmental and political losses that reach the point of dissolving the militias, which may lead to a militia war against the State of Iraq, which will test the Iraqis and their ability to eradicate the militia cancer, which led to The death of Lebanon, before this cancer escalates and destroys Iraq as well.
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