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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Many Topics Including The Oldest Dinar Community. Copyright © 2006-2020


    The stability of Iraq depends on the survival of international forces

    Rocky
    Rocky
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    The stability of Iraq depends on the survival of international forces Empty The stability of Iraq depends on the survival of international forces

    Post by Rocky Sat 05 Aug 2017, 2:01 am



    The stability of Iraq depends on the survival of international forces

     Translation: Range

    After the defeat of a group in Mosul and its possible collapse in al-Raqqa, the urgent question remains what will happen in the areas liberated by the US-backed forces.
    This question is important to the United States because of the leadership role it played when it formed the hostile anti-terrorist coalition of 60 countries after the fall of Mosul in 2014.
    Since taking office, President Trump has followed a similar approach to his predecessor by focusing narrowly on ousting Saddam while reducing the US military commitment.
    With the end of the alleged caliphate, Trump's policy options will affect the fate of liberated areas and perhaps the entire region. The decision to dissolve the Iraqi army and other mistakes that followed the invasion of Iraq affected post-war efforts, as did the decisions on how to govern and stabilize key Sunni areas in Iraq and Syria.
    The United States sought consensus or at least an understanding between key stakeholders - the Iraqi central government, the Kurdistan Regional Government and the popular mobilization forces - prior to the Mosul campaign, and coordinated with the United Nations to develop a comprehensive humanitarian response plan in anticipation of large numbers of displaced civilians from Mosul.
    Mosul, however, is completely destroyed and will require a massive effort to restore any aspect of its natural life. With other cities such as Ramadi and Falluja devastated, the United States must mobilize European, Arab and Asian countries for reconstruction efforts and to monitor abuses by local authorities that may be tumultuous with local Sunnis.
    It is essential that the local authorities view the governing bodies established in the liberated areas as legitimate and this will require a transparent process of selection of political representatives and the ability to provide basic security services.
    Failure in any of them can strike a wedge between the authorities and the desperate local population who may turn into warlords or terrorist organizations.
    To avoid this scenario, the United States must turn the hostile alliance into a long-term governance and reconstruction program in coordination with local government bodies and the central government (and the Kurdistan Regional Government if necessary). This will require Baghdad and Washington to formalize the US military presence in Iraq so that US forces can continue advising Iraqi security forces and emergency assistance in the event of a security setback, the key to negotiating a status-of-forces agreement. It is possible to reduce the number of US military personnel in Iraq - currently about 5,000 - by half and will still be sufficient to provide technical support and capacity building for Iraqi forces.
    عن About: UBI To avoid this scenario, the United States must turn the hostile alliance into a long-term governance and reconstruction program in coordination with local government bodies and the central government (and the Kurdistan Regional Government if necessary). This will require Baghdad and Washington to formalize the US military presence in Iraq so that US forces can continue advising Iraqi security forces and emergency assistance in the event of a security setback, the key to negotiating a status-of-forces agreement. It is possible to reduce the number of US military personnel in Iraq - currently about 5,000 - by half and will still be sufficient to provide technical support and capacity building for Iraqi forces. عن About: UBI To avoid this scenario, the United States must turn the hostile alliance into a long-term governance and reconstruction program in coordination with local government bodies and the central government (and the Kurdistan Regional Government if necessary). This will require Baghdad and Washington to formalize the US military presence in Iraq so that US forces can continue advising Iraqi security forces and emergency assistance in the event of a security setback, the key to negotiating a status-of-forces agreement. It is possible to reduce the number of US military personnel in Iraq - currently about 5,000 - by half and will still be sufficient to provide technical support and capacity building for Iraqi forces. عن About: UBI This will require Baghdad and Washington to formalize the US military presence in Iraq so that US forces can continue advising Iraqi security forces and emergency assistance in the event of a security setback, the key to negotiating a status-of-forces agreement. It is possible to reduce the number of US military personnel in Iraq - currently about 5,000 - by half and will still be sufficient to provide technical support and capacity building for Iraqi forces. عن About: UBI This will require Baghdad and Washington to formalize the US military presence in Iraq so that US forces can continue advising Iraqi security forces and emergency assistance in the event of a security setback, the key to negotiating a status-of-forces agreement. It is possible to reduce the number of US military personnel in Iraq - currently about 5,000 - by half and will still be sufficient to provide technical support and capacity building for Iraqi forces. عن About: UBI

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