British secret documents revealed that London rejected a US military plan to prevent Iran from winning over Iraq . 

According to the BBC, which asked at the beginning of its report, published today, what is driving Britain to oppose Trump's policy towards Iran to the extent that it leads the European efforts to enable Tehran to circumvent the US sanctions? 

"It is Iran's strategic importance to Britain and the West as a whole," he said.

The BBC's "secret" documents indicate that the disparity in the British and US visions of Iran dates back to the eight-year war between 1980 and 1988 between Iran and Iraq. 

The site says the war ended after Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, agreed to an international ceasefire and negotiation agreement, saying his famous saying on July 18, 1988: "Death and martyrdom are less humiliating than this, Poison when it agreed to the decision. " 

The documents reveal that the United States had an obsession is Iran's victory in the war. I have worked hard, militarily and economically, to prevent this. 

According to the documents, the Americans saw that this military development gave Iran a "psychological momentum" made it "does not indicate that it is ready not to go to war."

This situation continued until the Iraqi army regained the island in April 1988, a few months before the cessation of the war by UN resolution. 

On 19 and 20 March 1986, US-British talks on the war took place in Washington . It seemed clear to the British that the Americans planned to intervene in ways, including military power, to prevent Iran's victory. 

The position of the British Ministry of Defense is clear, which, according to documents, rejected the American trend and insist on non-participation no matter what the Americans insisted on going. 

In a report on the talks, the ministry said: "The visit was very useful. We served our purpose to confirm our fundamental support for US policy in the Gulf, but also to express our concern about the risks involved in hasty or exaggerated military action."

"We should not, in particular, be forced to support military action that we can not control, or that in the event of a crisis, we may have to disappoint US expectations of support," she said. The British Foreign Office supported this recommendation. 

The cause of the dilemma 
month later, a delegation from the Middle East Department of the British Foreign Office Washington, wrote J. H. Boyce, head of the department, on this visit visited , saying that Americans "asked for a joint military study of the conduct of the conflict in the Gulf in the future ... and to coordinate security assistance to the Gulf States." 

The Americans concluded that the Americans "are increasingly going to believe that Iran will win the war the longer it takes, so the US policy is directed to do everything possible to support Iraq at least until signs of Len's intransigence in Iran."

"They admit that in the light of the shortcomings of the political and military leadership in Iraq, what the United States can actually do is little: Iraq, for example, has all the weapons it needs, so they focus their attention on trying to curb Iran, . 

How did the Americans see how to achieve this goal? 

They first sought to stop arming Iran "so as not to be able to launch larger attacks at a greater pace." 

"Although they (the Americans) have had some success in slowing the flow of arms from the black market, arms are flowing from Eastern Europe, North Korea, Syria, Libya and China at an increasing rate to Iran," says the Pewes report. 

The document reveals that the Americans thought of military strikes paralyzing Iran.

"On the military side, [the Americans] thought a comprehensive and brilliant air attack on Iran's vital economic facilities could change Iranian behavior," Boyce said, "but Iraq's lack of resolve, military determination, and Iranian political obstinacy made this a very promising option." 

"The Americans have not been able to find a reasonable and credible scenario that can ensure Iraq's survival based on an independent weight capable of confronting Iran's power," Boyce said of the difference in thinking between Britons and Americans. 

"No Gulf response and American frustration." 
Faced with this extremely difficult impasse, Boyce predicted that his country would be under growing US pressure to abandon its "balanced approach" in the US effort to curtail Iran and limit its ability to win over Iraq.

About a month later, a high-ranking US military delegation, led by a general, accompanied by four of his aides, visited the British Foreign Office. 

The aim was for the delegation to present the results of a long 28-day tour of the region that included Qatar, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. 

A report by the British Foreign Office on the meeting reveals "frustration among the Americans about the lack of response by the Gulf states to America's readiness to cooperate in doing more to defend them" in light of the possible consequences of Iran's victory. 

"The Americans are frustrated by their contacts with the Gulf states," the report said, "Their position is still to keep the Strait of Hormuz open."

However, he noted that the Americans "told the GCC states that if they wanted more, they would have to play their part by providing bases at the ports, agreeing to joint exercises and joint contingency planning" for possible US military intervention. 

But the British document quoted Americans as saying that "although they (Gulfis) are more clearly concerned now than ever before, the GCC countries did not respond." 

A subsequent report by the Middle East Department at the Foreign Office said the Americans' assessment of the military standoff between Iran and Iraq remained very pessimistic. 
The report, which was written after the visit of a British delegation to Washington, outlined the American concerns in the following:

"First, it proved that Iraqi airpower is ineffective, even though, theoretically, it is superior to Iranian capability ... This ineffectiveness may be due to Saddam Hussein's unwillingness to launch comprehensive and effective attacks. Iran's positions have been well drilled, and thirdly, the buildup of forces near Hawar al-Huweizah (the Iraqi stronghold of Iran) has increased fears of a major (Iranian) attack in the next few months. " 

This visit underscored the seriousness of American concern over Iran's victory. Washington sought to persuade the British ally to engage in an emergency plan for possible military intervention that would prevent such a victory. 

But Britain has not changed its position. She said that, despite careful strategic relations with Washington, such engagement would be against its interests in the region. 

Strategic position
According to a document entitled "Iran / Iraq / contingency planning between the United Kingdom and the United States," the British Foreign Office reiterated the need to refrain from any US military plan to intervene in the course of the war. 

"While we have strong interests in maintaining our proximity to the Americans - on this issue (the war between Iraq and Iran), in order to keep up with American thinking and try to soften their approach - the British government's policy is to avoid too serious a discussion with the military American plans for operations in the Gulf region. " 

The document summarizes the final goal of this position against any possible US intervention aimed at preventing Iran's victory. "Serving our interests in the region would probably be better if the countries of the region do not consider us to be too closely involved in American planning," he said.

The Defense Department, in a report on a subsequent round of talks in Washington, said Britain's support for Washington hurt its interests. "We will probably best serve our interests in the region if the countries of the region do not see us from this angle (the angle of America's participation in military action)," she said. 

In a report written in July 1986, the Middle East Department said: "While Iran has greater significance and potential in the long term, better policy is a calm, unobtrusive and neutral approach to Iran and Iraq that allows us to have the maximum commercial advantage in the region all of which". 

After a new round of talks between US and British delegations in London on the "UK and US assessments" of the conflict, the two sides agreed that "the perception is that Iran is a big, important and strategically important country." In the long run, it will be important for the West to have good relations with it.

But the American assessment, according to a British report on the talks, was that Iran "may think that with one more push the Baath regime could collapse under its power and the Shah's regime collapsed," referring to the overthrow of the Islamic regime in Iran. 

In this context, the Americans talked about Iran "is now preparing a major attack final .. It will be a major blow to Iraq." 

The British understood that they believe that "for this or that reason, there is more than a chance of a possible collapse of Iraq, which makes the Iranians victorious and any expectations of what may happen then become very bleak." 

"Determination" of Iran and "prestige" of Saudi Arabia, 
but the British assessment was "continuation of the bloody conflict without a solution."

During the talks, the Americans claimed that "they see no contradiction between their short-term policy of starting to put pressure on Iran to avoid the above-mentioned scenario and their supposed belief that it is not in the long-term interest of the West not to have normal relations with Iran." 

But during the discussions, the British insisted on "making clear that the United Kingdom continues to take a neutral stance in the conflict and believes it should have as normal a relationship as possible with each side." 

Military power was not the only American means proposed to block any possible victory for Iran and the collapse of Iraq. 

The documents say the US strategy sought to "increase the economic cost incurred by the Iranians to launch this war."

"After their (stalled) efforts to stop the flow of arms to Iran, the United States now (1986) focuses on limiting the expansion of Iran's credit facilities," which helps Iranians to import from abroad, says British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe in another report. 

As the Hao document reveals, the Americans have been in contact with nearly all Western European governments, Japan, Singapore and Turkey. 

When the issue of economic pressure on Iran was raised, the Foreign Office recommended that London argue that "pressure on the Iranians to put them in an economically difficult situation will not push them to negotiate and will harm the long-term position of the West."

"Iran's presence in the region and its political behavior are facts of life," says Hao, "meaning that it is a reality that needs to be dealt with." "Our understanding is that this (Iran's existence and behavior) is recognized by most countries the Gulf. " 

for Saudi Arabia, the British saw it" too pre - occupied prestige, but others believe that there is a need to reach a temporary settlement with Iran. " 

Hao pointed to other justifications for the British position , saying that the US policy" strengthens the resolve of Iranians to tighten belts and continue (in the war) . " 

He added , " Iran is flexible (ie able to advance after any faltering politically) and received Wadia and accustomed to austerity. "