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There is no doubt that the seventy-three members of the Sadrist bloc in the Iraqi Council of Representatives submitted their resignations in light of the direction of the leader of the movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, is an important shift in the paths of the political movement existing in the Iraqi arena over the past eight months, which followed the early parliamentary elections on the tenth of Last October.
This important shift is related in part to the greater numerical weight represented by the Sadrist movement in the House of Representatives, compared to other blocs and entities, and in another aspect of it is related to the political and public weight of the movement and its leader in the entire political process, whether it is a participant in it and a party to the government, or an opponent and boycott of it. .
The withdrawal of the Sadrist movement from the supreme legislative authority, and the compensation of the resigned members with the biggest losers in each electoral district, means, in what it means, a change in the parliament’s map and a change in the sizes of some blocs, specifically the Shiite ones. Naturally, this entails the emergence of new alliances and alignments, which may pave the way for the crystallization of the largest parliamentary bloc , which is responsible for naming the prime minister, thus breaking the deadlock and ending the political impasse. Initial indications are that the coordinating framework forces with some or most of the independents will form and announce the largest parliamentary bloc, if there are no surprises on the scene of events.
The other important transformation as a result of the withdrawal of the Sadrist movement, is the imbalance in the location and centrality of the Triple Alliance (Save the Homeland), consisting of the Sadrist Movement (73 deputies), the Alliance of Sovereignty with its two parts, al-Halbousi and al-Khanjar, consisting of about (60 seats), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (31 seats).
While the Kurdish and Sunni parties were striving hard to secure a two-thirds majority to pass their Kurdish candidate for the presidency, and then nominate al-Sadr's candidate for prime minister, then all the accounts were confused and the papers were mixed with the withdrawal of the current, and Mr. whatever decisions they see fit.
Perhaps the biggest confusion will be in the circle of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which was hoping through the tripartite alliance and what it could include of independents, to pass its candidate for the presidency of the republic, the current Minister of Interior in the local government of the Kurdistan Region, Reber Ahmed Barzani, and with the withdrawal of the Sadrists, the Democrat’s hopes may be to acquire The presidency of the republic from the grip of its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, has completely or almost completely dissipated, especially in light of the alliance and the alignment of the latter with the coordinating framework.
The impact of the Sadrist withdrawal may not be on the Sunni component, represented by the alliance of al-Halbousi and al-Khanjar, to the same extent on the Kurdish component, represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, because the former believes that its share in any upcoming government formation will be guaranteed, in addition to having obtained from the beginning the presidency of the parliament, knowing that This site seems threatened and vulnerable to the winds of change, if the papers are rearranged again.
The other transformation, which falls under the door of hypotheses and possibilities, is the possibility of moving towards dissolving Parliament and going to other early parliamentary elections, and there is no doubt that if Mr. Al-Sadr and his movement adopt this option, his path will be passable, for several reasons, including exceeding the constitutional deadlines for choosing the President of the Republic. The formation of the government, the support of political forces and cultural and societal elites for this option, and the increase in public pressures demanding reforms and addressing the large number of problems and economic and public life crises.
Such a trend, means that the Sadrist movement will replace or replace its presence and political influence under the dome of Parliament and in the political forums and circles concerned with decision-making and defining paths, with a broad mass movement that serves as a popular opposition capable of imposing its choices and priorities. What confirms this, is that he instructed the members of the Sadrist bloc to resign, instead of the political-parliamentary opposition, and perhaps this is what prompts the forces of the coordination framework, along with others, to strive and move seriously to keep al-Sadr in the circle of political movement through his role in choosing the prime minister and the next cabinet, And with regard to the overall issues and strategic files.
The task of satisfying al-Sadr and keeping him in the circle of active political movement may seem to a large extent difficult, because over the course of about seven months, he categorically rejected the consensual formula in forming the government, and insisted on forming a national majority government, and after finding that all roads were blocked in front of him, I offer to withdraw.
Although the Sadrist movement’s decision confused the general political scene, rejoiced some, worried others, and imposed different options, it will not be the last chapter in the scenario of government formation, and it will not necessarily be the beginning. For the end of the political blockage in the country, however, what is certain - or almost certain - is that the option of confrontation and internal fighting seems highly unlikely and remote, because the conditions, circumstances and external influences that created and nourished some of the tools and means of conflict and internal fighting in previous times, have changed a lot. It is either no longer effective or it has disappeared and vanished, without this meaning that some embassies, centers and internal and external political circles do not continue to seek to exploit the political movement or the movement of the street, and employ it to serve their interests and help implement their agendas, but it is difficult - if not It is impossible for it to succeed, after it has failed miserably many times over the course of nineteen years, replete with various titles of terrorism, conspiracies, destructive projects, and agendas of sedition, devastation and sabotage.
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