“Framework” coups with Sunni facades on the map of local governments in preparation for the 2025 ele

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[size=52]“Framework” coups with Sunni facades on the map of local governments in preparation for the 2025 elections[/size]

[size=45]Baghdad/ Tamim Al-Hassan[/size]
[size=45]Attempts to amend the old map for forming local governments, which has only been in place for a few months, are likely to escalate as the date of the legislative elections, which are supposed to be held next year, approaches.
So far, “political shocks” have occurred in four governorates, two of which are in cities described as “mixed,” and the rest are in governorates with a Sunni majority. This coincided with changes at the “center” level and the election of the parliament speaker.
This is the second time that the predictions of the “Coordination Framework,” which controls the governments of nine governorates, regarding the results of the local elections held in 2023 have come true.
The “Framework” had predicted before the elections what it considered at the time to be a “componential imbalance,” according to Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Hikma Movement, as a result of the Sadrist movement’s withdrawal from the competition.
The Shiite alliance at the time expected - and this is what actually happened - that the vacuum left by the Sadrist movement (a Shiite movement) in the provinces would be filled by Sunni forces, which would push these parties to compete with the “framework” in forming governments.
The Shiite alliance entered into difficult negotiations after the local elections, and previous agreements collapsed due to the rise of Sunni forces in some provinces, especially in Diyala, which formed separate alliances with Shiite forces.
It was logical, according to an official in one of the Shiite parties who spoke to Al-Mada newspaper, that “local governments would be shaken because they were not built on solid foundations, but rather on quick agreements and not broad alliances.”
Diyala Once again,
Diyala was a major complication for the “Coordination Framework” until Nouri al-Maliki, the leader of the State of Law, was able to pass the government, amid the “discontent” of Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr Organization.
This happened more than nine months after the end of the local elections that were held in December 2023, and the competition was fierce between al-Maliki and al-Amiri, and the Sunni allies who were also divided between the two parties.
The State of Law leader struck a deal with Khamis al-Khanjar, the leader of the Sovereignty Party—who was apparently recently forced to resign from his party over the “de-Baathification” file against him—to share the governorship and council chairmanships.
After short-lived protests from the Badr Organization in Diyala over the local government formation, the situation stabilized until a rapprochement occurred between Mohammed al-Halbousi (leader of Taqaddum) and Qais al-Khazali (leader of Asa’ib).
The two sides compensated for the loss of Diyala in Kirkuk, striking a deal with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, with Taqaddum taking the council chairmanship there, before turning to Diyala again. The
Diyala provincial council voted to dismiss its chairman, Omar al-Karwi, from the Sovereignty Alliance, after questioning him last week.
The council decided to appoint the deputy chairman, Salem Abbas Abdullah al-Tamimi, from Asa’ib, as acting council chairman.
During an emergency session last Thursday, the council voted to elect Nizar al-Lahibi (from Halbousi) as the new council chairman.
But Al-Kroui surprised everyone and announced yesterday, Sunday, his return to the position after winning a provincial order requiring the suspension of the decision to dismiss him until the lawsuit filed in this regard is decided.
Al-Kroui said in a statement: “In implementation of the provincial order issued, and the suspension of all administrative and legal procedures issued after October 29.”
Before Al-Karwi was dismissed, a crisis had erupted in the province due to disagreements over the distribution of local positions.
A former official in Diyala who preferred to remain anonymous said: “The positions of directors of administrative units sparked the problem and caused a change in political alliances within Diyala.”
MP Raad Al-Dahlaki, head of the Azm Alliance in Diyala, had previously warned in a statement that “backtracking on political agreements would have negative repercussions that would extend beyond Diyala and affect the rest of the provinces, which would lead to confusion in the political scene in general.”
The effects spread
Hours after the Diyala crisis, the Salahuddin Council decided to dismiss its head, Adel Al-Sumaidaie, who is affiliated with the Islamic Party allied with Faleh Al-Fayyadh, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Al-Sumaidaie rejected the decision to dismiss him, and said in previous statements that he would “resort to the judiciary.”
Al-Sumaidaie was removed due to accusations of “monopoly” over decisions in the provincial council.
Al-Fayyadh had angered the “Coordination Framework” when he reached agreements with Sunni forces alone to form the government in Salahuddin.
The actions of the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces were considered the main reason for the collapse of the Shiite consensus on forming local governments.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq threatened to divide Salah al-Din into northern and southern provinces due to the agreement on forming the government from which it was excluded.
Meanwhile, the Nineveh Provincial Council denied yesterday the existence of a movement to dismiss its head, in a second impact after the Diyala crisis.
Leaks had reported that al-Fayadh had moved to dismiss the head of the Nineveh Council, Ahmed al-Hasoud, and replace him with a member affiliated with him, Mohammed Ahris.
Ahris denied in a statement, while mediating the members of the Nineveh Future in the council, which includes the Coordination Framework alliances, that “there is no truth to the rumors circulating about the existence of a movement to dismiss the head of the council, and that what is being circulated are lies that are baseless.”
Ahris explained: “In the name of the Nineveh Future Alliance, we express our support for al-Hasoud in light of the circumstances that the province is going through, expressing our full confidence in the head of the council.”
Before that, there was a movement in Dhi Qar against the Hikma Movement, which holds the position of governor there.
Before the coup plotters against the Dhi Qar government formation agreement, who are from the “Coordination Framework”, could dismiss the governor, the council chairman, who is from the second camp, was dismissed.
Abdul-Baqi Al-Omari, the dismissed council chairman, who is from the Sand Alliance led by Ahmed Al-Asadi, the Minister of Labor and a leader in the “Framework”, was returned by a judicial decision, similar to what happened in Diyala.
This was preceded by attempts in Baghdad to dismiss the council chairman affiliated with Khamis Al-Khanjar’s party, which formed the government in agreement with the State of Law, before the latter rushed to dismiss Ammar Al-Hamdani, a member of “Progress”, and then he was also reinstated to his position by a judicial decision.
In Baghdad, there is still an “undeclared” move to dismiss Governor Abdul-Muttalib Al-Alawi, who is from the Dawa Party, Maliki’s wing, in favor of another candidate from Yasser Sakhil, Maliki’s son-in-law and head of the Al-Bashaer Movement, on the pretext that the governor has reached the legal retirement age.
Searching for a leader!
Regarding these movements, Ihsan Al-Shammari, a researcher and academic, suggested that the reason is “the fragile equations that produced provincial councils and local governments.”
Al-Shammari said: “The pressure of the constitutional period and the very rapid distribution of interests produced fragile governments that will not last long.”
“I think what is happening is part of the preparation for the upcoming parliamentary elections; whoever controls the local governments can fortify themselves with great capabilities through what the local governments possess,” added Al-Shammari, a professor of public policy at the University of Baghdad.
The professor of politics also suggested that “alliances have changed significantly on the federal scene, and the Sunni forces are getting closer to some Shiite parties, which may turn into a broad alliance in the coming days, which led to the recent transformations.”
Al-Shammari, who is also head of the Center for Political Thought, pointed to “an unseen Sunni struggle to achieve leadership in some cities, which is leading to changes.”[/size]
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