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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

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    Carnegie Center: the quota system and the absence of military doctrine weakened the Iraqi army and l

    Rocky
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    Carnegie Center: the quota system and the absence of military doctrine weakened the Iraqi army and l Empty Carnegie Center: the quota system and the absence of military doctrine weakened the Iraqi army and l

    Post by Rocky Sun 17 Jan 2016, 4:29 am

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    Carnegie Center: the quota system and the absence of military doctrine weakened the Iraqi army and led to its collapse in 2014


    Baghdad / term 
    1/17/16
    Civil-military relations in Iraq ... the first episode
     
    This regional approach depth has been prepared as part of the project "Rethinking Civil Relations - Military 
    2015-2014: political and economic governance in the transitional phase," developed by the Carnegie Center for the Middle East seeking to upgrade research on the armed forces in the Arab countries and the challenges of the stage of democratic transition. 
    The control Daash to Mosul in the summer of 2014, dark moment for the civilian and military leaders in Iraq.In its wake, each party the other party blamed the rapid disintegration of the four heavily armed military teams. 
    Were civilian leaders commanders accused of failing to provide guidance and funding of caffeine, while the civilian and military counterparts Ba_i_ra corruption charged in their midst, and high absenteeism rates, and low training standards and poor cohesion . 
    Both sides are right, but the civil relations - military dysfunctional was the main reason for the collapse of the army. It was civilian control in the hands of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki alone, unchecked, and became army sectarian institution ineffective. 
    Instead of working on the development of the common responsibilities of Defense, and the foundation for the exchange of balanced military experience and civilian resources, and the application of the principles of accountability, merit, and reducing the intervention of the parties in each other affairs, appeared a system based on mistrust, intervention and exclusion. 
    Because of fears of the emergence of political challenges on the part of the officer corps, sought the then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who served as prime minister between 2006 and 2014, to impose his personal control strict on Army. 
    To achieve this, al-Maliki has resorted to grasp the need to ensure the most effective civilian control in order to intervene in a wide fan of military matters. Intervened directly in military matters, ranging from the decision-making of individuals, access to equipment and supplies, while marginalized also political and institutional actors and other responsible nominally management relations civil-military (but weaker than the exercise of power, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Committee on Security and Defense in parliament). 
    It is through the reduction of the opinion of the armed forces in defense policy and administration, Maliki weaker institutional and combat capabilities, and the campus itself and the government of the necessary experience. 
    Similarly, the Iraqi army commanders are unwilling or unable to act as the management affairs of defense they were assigned to a variety of reasons. Has been dissolved armed forces in 2003 for the association of former President Saddam Hussein's regime, however, had to be re-large segment of the officers to the service after 2005, because the new Iraqi army building process was moving too slowly amid worsening insurgency and the intensification of the pace of civil violence . 
    But despite the fact that they return pumped experiences are most needed, they also yielded negative results:
    corruption, and an aversion to the new forces, and the inability to afford inputs and interactions constructive. 
    These forces, which have been called again, were not you trust the US military doctrine and methods used to build a new Iraqi army between 2004 and 2011. As a result, these officers who were called to establish a constructive relationship with the executive branch, or the transfer of expertise and institutional memory to the new government was not able to. 
    Finally, the consecration of political sectarianism led to a weakening of the armed forces in a manner irreparable. Ethnic and religious identities have become suddenly is the cornerstone of the Iraqi government after 2003, and began to election officials and the employment of public servants commensurate with this style. 
    It is then on, became the quotas are determined by the allocation of all jobs in the armed forces and other state institutions, which is inconsistent with the principles of merit necessary to manage an effective army.This has affected particularly the higher ranks in the officer corps, which was composed mostly of Sunni Arabs, and began the numbers of Shiites and Kurds, Arabs outweigh the numbers of the year for the purposes of quota system. 
    Triangle shift in relations, military civil-happened in Iraq after getting rid of Saddam Hussein, when broke out armed resistance against the US occupation and the new political regime in late 2003. Because the United States had planned from the start to withdraw its troops by 2007, the Iraqi army was forced to build its institutions very quickly, at the time he was fighting the insurgency escalating. 
    In such the vicious circle, it was not in the army extended combat violence spread, because it was not prepared to do the job at the time, and that this same violence hindered his ability to complete the necessary preparations. 
    In 2005, intensified training and recruitment efforts, and by 2007 increased recruitment into the forces operations Iraqi security, when they grew violence to turn into a revolt. It has been recruited fourteen thousand men in the new Iraqi army every five weeks. Within six years, the Iraqi army volume reached four times, in terms of number of employees soldiers arrived to 200 thousand almost. 
    But, while receiving all members of the Iraqi forces almost a form of American training, they have been training normally take between 3 and 5 weeks , slightly more than the basic training period. 
    damaged the recruitment process that has to hurry wire officers in particular, because it takes years or even decades to train officers of mid-level or high. In 2008, it has been filled only 73% of the functions of the officers and 69% of the functions of non-commissioned officers, a gap that will not be bridged until the year (2018) at least. 
    The presence of officers is vital to any military force, because they are in charge of enterprise management as a whole. In units that have been created from scratch, as was the case with Iraqi army units after 2003, the officer corps is becoming more important in determining whether to maintain the cohesion of the army. 
    As US General Martin Dempsey said in 2007, when he was responsible for training Iraqi army: "We have increased the numbers of young officers from the rank of second lieutenant through the military academies for almost three years, but it's really hard to increase the number of officers, a lieutenant and Dean. simply can not be done overnight, so we had to rely more great to call officers and retraining programs, however, restore qualified officers set-ups began to subside. 
    "Because of their need for officers with experience, the United States began relying on officers who served in the former Iraqi army, where 70 percent of the officers, and all officer almost generals, who had served in the former Saddam Hussein's armed forces. 
    were not for the Security and Defense Committee in the Iraqi Parliament (ranging number of members between sixteen and seventeen since 2005), capable of overseeing the process of development of the army.Rarely he met members of the Committee in Parliament, because the violence made ​​the trip to and from the PLC dangerous adventure. In 2007, a bomb exploded inside the parliament and led to the death of a member.The explosion underlined the fact that even inside the heavily fortified Green Zone well, security remained elusive in Iraq's post in 2003. 
    During the first cycle in the post-Saddam era to him, parliament was forced to postpone several sessions because less than a quarter of its members (not even half a quorum) were attending to participate in its meetings addition, the boycott of parliament sessions have become (not to mention all of the elections, as did a lot of Sunni voters in the parliamentary elections of 2005) is a tool to express their opposition. The refusal regularly representatives of the bloc, which supports Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, the Iraqi party, parties loyal to the Kurds, to attend parliamentary sessions for this reason. 
    As a result, government officials in Iraq are working largely unchecked, in the period between 2003 and 2008.Government institutions did not start in practice (part) of its supervisory role, but at the end of that period, after the violence has ebbed to an acceptable level. Iraq's parliament was not called only a handful of officials, and continued to deal with absenteeism and differences. 
    2010 elections divisive, that a government led by a coalition of state law, led by al-Maliki has produced, hit paralyzed Parliament throughout the year, almost all of that. As was the case in previous years, the Commission on Security and Defense and Parliament as a whole did not work as observers institutionally on the defense sector. Attendance rates have improved gradually since 2010, it reached two-thirds. And cause seizure Daash in 2011 on large tracts of Iraqi territory in the high attendance rate to 87 percent. 
    Faced a rebuilding of the Ministry of Defence itself restrictions process, like other institutions in Iraq after 2003. Although the CPA Provisional had originally decided to reform the ministry only, they built from scratch instead. And it became the Ministry of Defence is the first in the history of the Iraqi working staff of civil servants, not the military. That may be a step forward in terms of confirmation of civilian control, but it was also meant that there are no longer any institutional memory for the benefit of, or prior to what should be the role of the Ministry of Defence Moreover, it was the Ministry of Defence, which suffer from a lack of in the labor force to deal with the military establishment, which is growing rapidly, which has led to the emergence of US and Iraqi fears that the ministry will not be able to exercise its authority in defense matters. The ministry building in six months and staffed without Iraqi contribution, and as a result, were not coherent not mature enough to prevent tampering, and Iraqi leaders feel they own. 
    Against this background of violence and build rapid institutions, Iraqi civilian relations - military distorted because of leaders civilian and military alike, and reinforced the society as a whole this distortion. 
    Maliki, who took office just months before abandoning the United States control of the Iraqi army in 2007, agreed with the American patron concern of the possibility that the army expands his influence to reach the field of politics. 
    On the Like most of his peers elected, Maliki was fully aware that the Iraqi army retained a prominent political role in most of the history of modern Iraq. In al-Maliki lives alone, it has been dropped three governments by military means, since Iraq's independence in 1932; and rocked the country six coups and coups counter, as well as seven coup attempts failed, three of which occurred during the reign of Saddam Hussein al-Maliki sought to rein in the army from carrying out any other attempts. 
    Even before al-Maliki took office, the Iraqi leadership has sought to "immunize itself from the coup", and has focused its efforts in particular on the Iraqi army, which reconstituted leadership.
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