Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Join the forum, it's quick and easy

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Welcome to the Neno's Place!

Neno's Place Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality


Neno

I can be reached by phone or text 8am-7pm cst 972-768-9772 or, once joining the board I can be reached by a (PM) Private Message.

Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Would you like to react to this message? Create an account in a few clicks or log in to continue.
Established in 2006 as a Community of Reality

Many Topics Including The Oldest Dinar Community. Copyright © 2006-2020


    Carnegie Center: the Iraqi army has seen a sharp division between veteran leaders and young people t

    Rocky
    Rocky
    Admin Assist
    Admin Assist


    Posts : 280229
    Join date : 2012-12-21

    Carnegie Center: the Iraqi army has seen a sharp division between veteran leaders and young people t Empty Carnegie Center: the Iraqi army has seen a sharp division between veteran leaders and young people t

    Post by Rocky Mon 18 Jan 2016, 3:36 am

    [You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]
    Carnegie Center: the Iraqi army has seen a sharp division between veteran leaders and young people trained by the Americans


    Baghdad / term 
    1/18/16
    Civil-military relations in Iraq - Episode II
     
    This regional approach depth has been prepared as part of the project "Rethinking Civil Relations - Military 
    2015-2014: political and economic governance in the transitional phase," developed by the Carnegie Center for the Middle East seeking to upgrade research on the armed forces in the Arab countries and the challenges of the stage of democratic transition.

    Ago the measures carried out by al-Maliki to what is much further, where to centralize the military under his command decision-making process, and took advantage of personal or sectarian affiliations loyalties to the exclusion of other political actors elected parties. And he founded the paramilitary groups as a counterweight of the armed forces, and established security devices to control the army. Maliki also sought to prevent collective action, by intervening directly in the relations between officers and soldiers. 
    Was commanding general of the Office of Maliki tool key to enhance the control of the armed forces, has been used to bypass other state institutions involved in theory-military relations civil-. 
    Headed the office, which originally designed as a body for coordination, headed by the prime minister, Farouk al-Araji, an ally of the owners had served in Saddam Hussein's army, and was promoted to the rank of major general and deputy general commander of the armed forces. In this capacity, al-Araji supervised the ministries of defense and interior (and ignored) already controlled the security issues in Iraq. Was al-Araji, who worked outside any legal framework, responsible only to the Prime Minister. 
    What that al-Maliki took over the defense and interior portfolios in 2010, until he became Commander in Chief executive body of the actual sector all the security office, which led to the marginalization of the ministries concerned. 
    In spite of the existence of civilian opposition to al-Maliki's efforts to consolidate his power, but they were very weak and lacks the expertise to pose a real challenge. It is not placed adequate control mechanisms, and the deteriorating security situation has led to divert attention to another place. 
    Those who opposed the executive excesses of the owners actively, has been punished and often marginalized. And found the then Defense Minister Abdul-Qader al-Obeidi, who sought not to politicize the ministry and the armed forces, himself banned from running in the 2010 elections under the pretext of its association with the Baath party, it came as al-Maliki opposition activities in the security sector of Muqtada al-Sadr and Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani. Often criticized al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric leader of a major political-military movement and a former ally of Maliki, the prime minister publicly. By 2008 he was exiled chest and resolve his militia entirely. 
    However, resumed chest criticism after his return to Iraq in 2011, and issued a "final warning for the government to assume its duty to protect the people" and "the prosecution and expulsion of Members of incompetents and traitors in the security services who do not seek However, to power and pride. 
    "At the same time, accused Barzani, President of Kurdistan Region, al-Maliki as an authoritarian seeks to exercise full authority over the armed forces. In 2012, Barzani ended its cooperation with al-Maliki, and raised the possibility of Kurdish secession. As mentioned al-monitor site, has called on Barzani to "resolve the leadership of the Iraqi army because it is unconstitutional," and criticized al-Maliki control of the security sector. 
    He challenged Barzani also President of the Parliament and the Council of Ministers President "because of the face of Maliki's dictatorial methods". Barzani and al-Sadr was endorsed by a vote in the parliament of no confidence from the Maliki government in 2012, but the vote failed due to lack of quorum. 
    In the light of the absence of effective civilian opposition, al-Maliki dedicated control of the security sector through a series of measures. Has established regional command centers collect all military and police operations in the most affected by the violence in 2007, nine provinces, and put them under the command of generals loyal to him, and then use the al-Maliki of the centers that were directly related to his office, to bypass the other decision-making bodies, including the Ministries of the Interior and defense. 
    Instead of going through the formal command structure, al-Maliki has established an informal leadership structure by issuing direct orders to officers, but was not related to them personally in some cases. Al-Maliki also confuse combat plans when they wish to do so, by moving his forces and the arrest warrant on dissidents individuals. 
    The control Daash to Mosul, in the summer of 2014, the moment of pitch for the Iraqi army, which saw the disintegration of the four teams of heavily armed rapidly. 
    With Maliki's government, the Adjutant General's office subjected to several units of the elite to control, such as the Sixth Brigade of the fifty-sixth of the Iraqi Army Division (also known as the Baghdad Brigade). This has led to the weakening of the authority of the Ministry of Defence. 
    The transfer of command "Special Operations Forces" is also the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense to the Adjutant General's office, and is increasingly used as a personal security device for the owners, in charge of targeting political opponents. And soon gained the troops title of "Fedayeen al-Maliki," duplicate the experience of "Fedayeen Saddam" earlier, a paramilitary force charged with protecting the regime established in the nineties of the last century, the former Iraqi president. That 
    before the establishment of the office, targeting someone need the approval of the Ministerial Committee on Security National, and the Prime Minister, and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Command of the Iraqi army, and the ministers of justice, interior and defense. By 2010, al-Maliki began referring to himself as the Commander in Chief, in spite of the absence of such a position in accordance with the Iraqi constitution. 
    It is by claiming that he has the power "in his capacity as Commander in Chief," al-Maliki demanded a recount of the votes in the 2010 elections, and demand the dismissal of officials top of the "Integrity Committee" in charge of the fight against corruption. 
    (Article 78 of the Iraqi Constitution reads as follows: The Prime Minister is the direct executive responsible for public policy of the state, the general commander of the armed forces. editor). 
    As Maliki's intervention in their own military personnel policy to create a network of officers loyal to him. He appointed and promoted officers without the required approval of Parliament, through these decisions are classified as temporary, and he recruited individuals with little or no in the officer corps of military experience (he was called the merger officers). It was their job is to maintain a network of informers al-Maliki in the military. 
    The senior leaders had also experienced to step down or cancel their decisions in many cases. The officers who tried to reduce the role of the Shiite militias, have been expelled without any consideration of official procedures and the chain of command. Kurdish officers have been cleared of two divisions in Mosul, and replaced by loyalists of the owners. 
    Did not load close to the officers responsible for the failure of the Prime Minister, such as the failed investigations into the terrorist attacks. These appointments and promotions and expulsions from the service made ​​the Iraqi army empty of any appearance to the principles of merit. 
    Achieved the measures carried out by al-Maliki, the desired effect: the armed forces are no longer in a position to stage a coup. However, once it is fighting on a large scale during the time of progress Daash in Mosul in June 2014, the army was not able to effectively fight a war. Dempsey, who was then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been reversed, this feeling when he said in September 2014 that about half of Iraqi combat brigades could only be regarded as "a respected partner." He added that he "seems to have a certain amount of cohesion and commitment to the central government", before warning that brigades remaining have problems related to the "penetration and leadership and sectarianism." 
    Armed forces, contributed to, and the defense establishment also in the emergence of a civilian-military relations distorted in Iraq after 2003, since the beginning, the officers split on several fronts, making the army is unable to communicate openly with the civilian leadership. 
    The divisions in the officer corps of the Iraqi army as a result of a defect in the rebuilding process. Officers who were summoned again in the rank of colonel lost focus and above, unlike new recruits who are almost entirely in positions minimum or medium. 
    As a result, most of the senior officers of the year who have been trained in accordance with the traditions of the military culture Batah- Soviet, while the low-ranking owners in younger army, trained by the Americans, and the proportion of 50 percent of them at least from the Shiites. 
    responded both groups to new situations in a different way: they adapt officers younger than those with previous military experience few or bad with the decentralization of American leadership styles, while resisted senior officers of this new direction. 
    As expected, Veteran Iraqi officers began to work in their profession based on previous military experience, including the war against Iran (1980-1988), Kuwait (1990), the International Alliance (1990-1991). This has necessitated the reliance on strict hierarchical structures and the extensive use of artillery and a few of the views and comments. 
    According to the two researchers, it is "at a time when many of the officers up to the higher levels, the confidence in their own judgments were established and practiced and rewarded. As a result, they tend to confidence in their intuition more than confidence experimental evidence that offer them. 
    "There was an effective military exercises, which can help overcome the resistance of the old ways, to a limited extent and at the level of the lower military ranks. 
    did not become a college Iraqi National Defense College of the Iraq war, which Drepetta military from the upper ranks, in operation only in 2011. Even then, the Faculty of Defense did not include only a small number of high-ranking in the students body comprising 30 members. 
    The few American attempts to bridge the gaps between the various Iraqi military layers are, according to a report released International Crisis Group, "originally designed to put an end to the culture of authoritarianism and brutality of the former regime, and the laying of greater respect for human rights and the rule of law," but the mattress top resisted these efforts, and considered incompatible with their own military traditions. 
    and failed the higher echelons of the Iraqi military assigned to their communication with the civilian leadership, especially with the executive branch, in a frank and constructive dialogue. 
    have been affected approach military leaders for their work in the absence of confidence in the sectarian political leadership, lack of satisfaction with the new military culture imported from the United States, the national humiliation presumably due to disband the Iraqi army. 
    Thus , rather than building something new, Iraqi commanders drawers returned to the military culture formed by the penal disciplinary measures do not accept constructive criticism, and put decision-making in the hands of the executive branch. Waddell military, who described in a study that they are of "men stamping", are not ready to bear as a result, could not the military play a constructive role, such as it is envisaged by a sound and democratic security wire. 
    Sometimes, the military tried to advise and open criticism, such as warning that the army is not ready to cope with the withdrawal of the United States in 2011. Another example is the resignation of the commander of the band 17 in 2013, complaining publicly of the "Command is professional, and the adoption of wrong policies of senior military leaders, and to take random decisions." But, altogether, the military remained silent, and senior military commanders continued to put forward a model of civil-military relations acquired during the reign of Saddam Hussein.
    [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

      Current date/time is Mon 04 Nov 2024, 6:02 pm