TO SECURE A 3RD TERM MALIKI IS RUNNING ON THE BLOOD OF IRAQIS

TO SECURE A 3RD TERM MALIKI IS RUNNING ON THE BLOOD OF IRAQIS



01/16/2014


On December 27th at dawn one of the strangest and most heinous crimes was committed by the Iraqi Prime Minister in a state that is supposed to be governed by law and a Constitution. The Iraqi Special Forces, under direct special orders from Maliki, who holds multiple Security and Defense positions, by using the highest means of violence and the arrest of MP Alwani as well as killing his brother, sister-in-law and a number of MP guards and their entourage. 

As a Prime Minister, Maliki is thought of as a silly character but not one person could have imagined him taking things to such extremes. This criminal The incident provoked indignation of many both inside and outside of Iraq, the Maliki government in the days following the accident, once again justified the actions of the Iraqi Armed Forces by stating that the MP (Alwani) was not a target but was arrested because he had ordered his guards to resist the attacking force, once again claiming that the Attorney was also in touch with Al-Qaida Ranks.

In fact, most probably, the incident came in context of a broader more complex issue than a mere accidental arrest of a Parliamentary Deputy or non-Deputy, and that the Chairman of the bloody government, Maliki, wants to ensure himself a third term even if the price is the shedding the blood of thousands of Iraqis.

The Iraqi Parliamentary elections were supposed to occur at the end of March 2014, which will be fought between Maliki's Shiite State of Law bloc and competing factions with two major Shiite party’s  (Hakims – Citizen Party and Sadr’s – Liberal Party, one Sunni block (Nujaifi’s – United Party) and the Kurdish blocs.

During Maliki’s first four years of his rule he tried to promote himself as the savior from Iraqi civil violence and strife, he adopted policies of non-sectarianism, at least in form and speech. But because judgment is determined on the merits he then showed his true colors as has he returned to the second –half of his first term adopting a policy of discrimination and ugly sectarianism, ousting any presence of 
substantial Sunni leaders that were and are influential in the organs of the state and the government, in the military, security institutions, and universities, and have even led in activities of institutions and associations within the Sunni civil society and media. This led to the birth of the Iraqi List, which included both Shiites and Sunnis who adopted a vision of national inclusion. Maliki fought, Allawi’s mixed party during his first term and during the election four years ago, Maliki ran solo with the emergence of the State of Law Party, where in spite of counterfeiting and attempts to prevent the Sunni citizens from voting, Maliki still could not win – as he lost to Allawi 91 to 89 seats respectively. What resulted was that the President (Talabani) and the Government were pressured by Maliki in the Constitutional Court, a FATWA was issued which allowed for the formation of an Alliance between Shiite forces. Following the outcome of the election and pressure from Iran on Iraqi Shiite forces to support Maliki desirous to return Maliki to the Presidency of the Government. 

However, after the arrival of Maliki's illegal Government, as a result of external pressures, was going to be a failure of his second term even before its inception. The parties agreed that Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions would form a national unity Government, with reluctance, without feeling the slightest of confidence in the leadership of Government. Maliki, believed by everyone to renege, quickly denied all agreements which paved the way for his second term. Then took on financial corruptive means that were unprecedented since the Saddam occupation. The result was that his second term suffered from frequent withdrawals and mutual accusations between himself and his ministers from all blocks. He failed to agree on the Ministries of Interior and Defense. Maliki realized since the beginning of his second session that he has no hope of winning Sunni Arab votes and that his political fate is linked to the promotion of his Shiite image, in the face of other Shiite rival leaders and political blocs, as the defender of the Shiite-controlled Iraq, and only able to subdue Iraq's Sunnis.

With the outbreak of the revolution and the movement of Arab change, Maliki was forced to act as a link in the circle of influence of the Iranian LEVANTINE. The movement was born from the Arab Revolt which rapidly achieved victory in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, with its intricate or varying results in Yemen and Syria; the perception is that the Arab Change was not only an expression of democracy but also about the rise of Sunni Arabs in the Levant. Although this perception misses the fact that the overwhelming majority of Sunni were not easily won over by the governing style of Maliki and Assad’s system ignored blatantly ignored the rise of Islamic political forces, inside of the Sunni majority, in the Arab world. Here at the end, we feared the targeted revolutionary winds as it was apparent that as soon as Maliki was to control of the country he scrambled to the loyalty of Shiites of Iraq.

His first course of action was to topple Sunni Vice President Tariq Hashimi, trumping charges on him which would eventually force him to leave Iraq. Then he went after Sunni Finance Minister Rafie Issawi, then now Sunni MP Alwani and other Sunni leaders. In both cases, neither political figure was targeted at the same time, the Prime Minister then created major crises with the Kurdish regional government, and then he hastened to provide financial and tactical assistance to the Assad regime, which allowed Iraq to begin the commencement of wide and active recruitment of Shiite militiamen sent to fight alongside the Damascus regime, knowing that Syria is a country with a Sunni majority, as well. But Maliki who waged attacks in all directions was not pleased as a wide Popular Movement broke out in all six provinces, with Sunni majority. The government of Kurdistan then went back to the prime minister while the Syrian regime deteriorated. During 2003, the Maliki regime suffered with popularity and security challenges and a loss of control in more than two-thirds of Iraq. 

Although several developments and positive illusions were sold by the Maliki Gov’t in 2003; he thought it advantageous to begin working on shoring up his bid for a 2nd term campaign. Maliki started holding conciliatory talks with the Kurdistan Regional Government, achieved success in isolating the Sunni Arabs of the Government of Arbil and used the lure of money and generous promises to inflict serious splits within the Sunni political class.

Regionally, the Syrian revolution turned gradually to the long civil war and Western powers that supported the first revolution that toppled the Assad regime and sided with the Syrian people, but are now becoming increasingly concerned regarding the growing influence of Sunni armed groups in rebel ranks, including Syrians. The survival of Assad's regime has effectively and dramatically been weakened after stripping his chemical weapons. In North Iraq, Maliki focused on the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, by accusing the region of corruption as they were building blocks to  open the flow of oil that would funnel through Turkey on 17 December, where  Erdogan of Turkey his rule in attempts to dethrone or cripple his ability to move inside of the region.

In Iran his eastern neighborhood, Maliki accounted the agreement with the 5+1 group concerning Iran’s nuclear issue has fostered the development of Iran's political alliance and weakens the states that are deemed hostile to the President of the Iraqi government, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt while they look to balance regional power. These accounts were met in parallel with an
[7:23:19 PM] LJ: unprecedented escalation of years of attacks against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which revealed Iraq’s fragile security regime established by Maliki as Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Interior Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Unlike his first initiative which has gained popular character both militarily and politically the reflection of the beginning of his second campaign solely concentrated pure military rule. The Prime Minister pushed large segments of the army, federal police and special forces with the aim of eliminating Iraq’s State regulation and the Levant in the Anbar desert, then deflected in his campaign to try to disperse a sit-in in Anbar province, that has lasted for more than a year, and in a way ordered his troops to arrest lawmaker Ahmed Al-Alwani, one of the most prominent Maliki opponents and his ruling mechanisms which led Sunni supporters of the strike. But this time things did not go so well. For one full year the Maliki government has ignored to the demands of the protesters, fragmented the Sunni political class, deepening Sunni Arab frustration and the futility of peaceful means to achieve equality between the citizens of the country. So, when Maliki's forces began their assault the family of Attorney Alwani, the people of Anbar took to arms in defense of themselves and their sanctities. To say the Islamic State of Iraq Levant’s occupation of the cities of Anbar province was intended to mislead attempts to win public support both in and outside of Iraq. The fight against The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Islamic was considered normal, especially their collections and fighting against the forces of al-Maliki years ago. But the resistance bloc in Anbar province is one in which has spread in other governorates of Iraq composed mostly of ordinary citizens and children of tribal members. Unfortunately Maliki has realized in the last few weeks that his forces are unable to face the people and resolving armed battle.

So why does Maliki still enjoy support from his allies in Iran, who wants to see sectarian discord? Also from the Americans who naively see the his regime as the balance (DOES IT SEE IT THAT WAY?) in the Middle East and between Sunni and Shi’a sects?

His persistent intention and determination to fight this battle by the use of armed forces will only lead to more bloodshed and the disintegration of Iraq, forcing it into regional barriers, for a long time to come. The rebels of Anbar and other marginalized provinces will be hard pressed to challenge Maliki, especially without regional or international support, it would be virtually impossible to fight off Maliki’s Iraqi Army. The only alternative is to see all Iraqi’s as one by bridging the fate of the country with the inclusion of all SECTS in order to rebuild a political system that will ensure the rights of citizens.

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